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Introduction
CCSI's work to date on the questions of "shared use"
Since 2011, the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) has extensively researched how
mining-related infrastructure can best be leveraged for economic development. A first working paper
sets out the findings for mineral railways and ports. A second working paper extends the research to
power infrastructure. Both are available for download from CCSI’s website at:
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/leveraging-infrastructure-investments-for-development/.
In 2012-2013, CCSI collaborated with the World Bank to systematically assess the potential and
challenges of power-mining integration in Sub-Saharan Africa. To that end, CCSI built the Africa
Power-Mining Database in 2013: it contains 455 projects in 28 Sub-Saharan African countries with a
minimum of US$250 million gross value of ores reserves, in all project phases, spanning the years
2000-2020. This database estimates the demand for power in 2000, 2012 and 2020 and identifies the
range of past, present and future power sourcing arrangements for the 455 projects. The study also
includes an assessment of the different institutional settings and policy instruments that have the
potential to lead to improved integration between mines' investment plans in power infrastructure
and governments’ plans for national power development.
In April 2013, CCSI was awarded a grant from the Australian Government to develop an
economically, legally and operationally rational framework to enable shared use of mining-related
infrastructure, including rail, ports, power, water, and internet and telecommunications (ICT). The
framework was obtained by distilling best practice principles from infrastructure developments
around the world to guide resource rich African governments in promoting shared use of miningrelated infrastructure. Three in-depth case studies, namely Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mozambique,
were chosen to apply the findings to country specific circumstances and refine the framework.
The draft of each infrastructure framework was presented at the “Shared Use of Mining-Related
Infrastructure” workshop held at Columbia University on November 15, 2013, at which 31 experts
from academia, development organizations, the private and public sectors provided feedback and
recommendations.1 The feedback has been integrated in the framework accordingly.

The importance of the question of shared use
The concept of “shared use” or “open access” relates to finding ways to leverage extractive-industryrelated infrastructure investments in developing countries for the broader benefit of the national and
regional community. According to the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic conducted by the
World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa faces an annual infrastructure funding gap of US$31 billion.2
Leveraging extractive-industry-related investment could help narrow this gap. Moreover, the
McKinsey Global institute has come to the conclusion that resource-rich countries have
infrastructure of a poorer quality than that in non-resource rich countries. The infrastructure gap of
the next 17 years (until 2030) is believed to be four times higher than that of the past 17 years, and
10% of the gap relates to developing the mineral resources in these countries (with 7% amenable to
multi-user- and 3% to multi-purpose infrastructure).
1
2

See Annex A for the agenda of the expert workshop and the participant list.
Established in 2006 for 10 years.
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To be beneficial for a country’s development, non-renewable resource extraction needs to be
leveraged to build long-term assets, such as infrastructure, that will support sustainable and inclusive
growth. This can be achieved, for instance, by capitalizing on the resource taxation potential and
reinvesting the tax revenues in all-weather roads but it can also be done by requiring shared use of
the resource infrastructure.
The challenge in relation to achieving shared use lies in the fact that natural resource concessionaires
have traditionally adopted an enclave approach to infrastructure development, providing their own
power, water, ICT, and transportation services to ensure that the basic infrastructure needed for their
operations is reliably available.3 Hence, large investments in physical infrastructure are often
uncoordinated with national infrastructure development plans. The country therefore misses the
opportunity to promote shared use of the infrastructure and to take advantage of potential synergies.
Shared use can be considered multi-user where several mining companies in a region use a particular
infrastructure, or multi-purpose where non-mining users have access to it (for example forestry
concessionaires sharing mining-related power infrastructure, or passengers being transported along a
mining-related railway line). Both should be promoted, as the former may lead to economies of scale
among mining companies thereby reducing the operating costs of the mines and increasing tax
revenues to the government, and the latter could lower the costs of water supply, energy,
transportation, and ICT services to other users, which may promote economic development in a
region.
As the World Bank’s report on Liberia states: “the interface with national infrastructure planning is
not well developed (…) the contracts do not give the sense of the concessionaires operating within or
accommodating themselves to a pre-existing national plan.”4
If companies and governments consider the potential of shared use infrastructure through the
expansion of the private sector’s planned investments at the design phase, the incremental capital
cost on the economy and the environment could be minimized, while the beneficial impact on
sustainable development would be optimized. Moreover, shared use can also foster social trust in the
potential contribution of mining to development.
The potential of leveraging infrastructure investments in extractive industries for national and
regional development is gaining prevalence among policymakers. The World Bank, the African
Development Bank and the African Union, along with various other development agencies, have
endorsed the concept, recognizing that private sector involvement is required to meet the vast
infrastructure funding gap in developing countries.5

3

See H. Singer, “The distribution of gains from trade and investment—revisited,” 11(4) Journal of Development Studies
376 (1975), pp. 376–382.
4
World Bank, “Infrastructure Policy Notes: Leveraging investments by natural resource concessionaires,” (2011).
5
See Masuma Farooki, “The infrastructure and commodities interface in Africa: Time for cautious optimism?,” 24
Journal of International Development (2012), p. 216.
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The challenges to successfully implementing the concept of "shared use"
1 - The negotiation package and its trade-offs
Governments and companies negotiate over the allocation of the economic rent – which is the
estimate of excess returns over the required return to the investor and, in theory, this rent should be
allocated to the owner of the resources, the government. In practice, this rent is the object of
negotiations that will take the form of a package of economic demands on mining companies. This
package is made up of fiscal obligations and non-fiscal obligations, such as local content and shared
use of infrastructure.
Depending on the priorities of the government, it can therefore negotiate higher demands in one
particular area (such as building its infrastructure at excess capacity and allowing multi-purpose
access), but if this comes at a significant cost to the company, the government should be prepared to
be more lenient on another negotiation point (such as, for example, fiscal receipts). This choice will
depend on whether the government believes that it can use fiscal revenues to create greater social
welfare than from requiring shared use of the infrastructure.
Within the government, there are likely to be different views on what aspects should be prioritized in
negotiations with mining companies. The Ministry of Finance is likely to view tax revenues as the
single most important negotiation point. The Ministry of Industry, on the other hand, more likely to
be concerned with local content provisions and domestic processing, whereas the Ministry of
Transport will be looking to negotiate shared use of the mining-related transport infrastructure. Prior
to entering negotiations all relevant government actors should agree on the negotiation tactics, on the
key issues that are of importance and on the possible trade-offs and compromise.
If a government wishes to implement shared use of mining-related infrastructure, it needs to assess
whether requesting shared-use from a mining concessionaire is worth the “price” – that is, the tax
revenues it would have to forego to incentivize the investor to accommodate such shared use on
some of its infrastructure. This price will be high if implementing shared use is an expensive
undertaking, as can be the case with opening up access to railways. The price can also be minimal
when the business case for shared use is easily made, as with ICT.
Moreover, from a macro-economic perspective, the higher the cost of the infrastructure, the higher
the need for a substantive demand for the infrastructure developed for public use which is not easily
achieved in undeveloped economies. Thus, shared use in the context of expensive infrastructure
such as rail, ports and power is worth the price of foregone revenues if (1) there are significant
economies of scale or scope so that the provision of extra capacity is inexpensive and (2) a real
market for that marginal low-cost capacity exists. If there are substantive economies of scope and
scale to benefit from, the business case for shared use and its associated savings will be improved by
economic pressure related to the decrease in commodity prices.
In the opposite case where the business case is not easily made and economies of scale and scope are
minimal or non-existent, social benefits might be greater if the investor pays a smaller amount to
ensure cell phone and drinking water capacity to the surrounding communities, and governments
retain higher tax revenues and takeover rights in relation to the railway lines at the end of the mining
concession.
6
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Negotiating this package is a complex undertaking, particularly in the context of long-term mining
contracts where circumstances may change over the course of the concession/ lease. Generally,
governments suffer from a great deal of asymmetry of information in relation to the cost of
developing and operating such infrastructure, as well as the impact on the projected cash flow of the
different scenarios. Given the potential capital expenditure involved in implementing shared use on
the part of the mining company and the price paid by the government in terms of foregone tax
revenues and establishing a regulatory authority to enforce the shared use on the mining-related
infrastructure, governments should prepare a detailed cost-benefit analysis of the negotiation
package, with external assistance if necessary. This negotiation should be framed in the context of a
broader planning effort for infrastructure expansion and public-private coordination. Adjusting the
requests for shared use to the level of present and future demand, as well as profitability of the
project, is even more important in times of falling commodity prices.

2- The competitive nature of the mining business
The competitive nature of large mining companies should not be underestimated. Even if rational
economic decision-making would suggest shared investment and multi-use of a particular
infrastructure project, rival mining companies may be unwilling to do so without strong regulatory
requirements and clear policy guidelines. This may due to several reasons: (i) large multinational
mining companies compete to supply different grades of ore to their consumers. If a second mining
company offers a product with similar characteristics, which is likely to be the case of nearby
concessions (candidate for sharing the same infrastructure) the first mining company can lose its
competitive advantage in the market; (ii) negotiation outcomes may be a result of corporate level
strategies rather than project specific discussions when multinational companies are involved in
several locations; (iii) mining companies can use their monopoly power on the infrastructure in the
region to acquire further regional concessions at a lower price if these are not viable without
infrastructure access; (iv) large-scale mining projects can have an impact on market prices. It may
therefore be in the interest of the leading mining company to restrict regional production to receive
higher prices for its product.

3 - The strategic quality of mining-related infrastructure assets
Two factors will determine the willingness of mining companies to share/ open up access to their
infrastructure:
1. The more costly and strategic the infrastructure, the less willing mining companies will be to
sharing it. In relation to the infrastructure types examined, this means that mining companies
are more likely to accept sharing internet and telecommunications (ICT) infrastructure,
followed by water and then power. Rail and port infrastructure are considered to be the least
amenable investments to shared-use models, given the vertically integrated logistic chain
from mine-to-rail-to-port operations.
2. The higher the potential of economic development associated with multi-purpose access to
infrastructure, the more inclined mining companies will be to cooperate to save their social
license to operate. For instance, a community perception that a mining company’s operations
are consuming available water resources, or contaminating/altering the flow of underground,
or surface waters can lead to social unrest and operational disruptions. In such a scenario, a
mining company is more likely to consider increasing the quantity of clean water available to
the community.
7
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The recent fall in commodity prices and declining profit margins in the mining sector could also
incentivize mining companies to consider share infrastructure among each other to minimize
costs.

4 - The dilemma of implementing shared use
If a government is determined to implement shared use, ownership of the infrastructure concession
becomes a decisive factor.
On the one hand, the government could incentivize shared use of mining-related infrastructure by
requiring a separation of ownership between the mine and the infrastructure concession. A third
party would therefore be required to operate the infrastructure, often with the mine as the anchor
project, but with the objective to maximize its profit and therefore design and operate the
infrastructure at maximum capacity – an objective that should lead naturally to shared use. It
however means that the infrastructure is a profit center for the infrastructure operator and in the
absence of competition, the infrastructure services are likely to be expensive – a feature that can be
worsened in the context of politically risky environments where there are no sovereign risk
guarantees.
On the other hand, user-concessions (whereby the miner-user also owns the infrastructure) allow for
lower hurdle rates in politically risky and low demand environments and make the infrastructure a
cost center, which results in an infrastructure project being less costly for both the owners and users.
Of course in this context, user-concessions bear the danger of the mine exerting its monopoly power
and thus a strong regulatory system is needed to guarantee shared use and ensure that the
infrastructure is designed with additional capacity to accommodate such shared use.
In short the dilemma can be summarized as follows:
1. Separation of ownership between the mine and the infrastructure: reduced risk of
monopoly, higher price of access to the infrastructure for the anchor project.
2. Integration of ownership between the mine and the infrastructure: higher risk of
monopoly and difficult to regulate, lower price of access to the infrastructure for the anchor
project.
To contain the price of access in alternative 1, it is advised to design a third party entity that can be
financed by the mine or by an off-take agreement with the mine but with the government or a nonprofit entity managing the infrastructure (the management can in turn be outsourced to a third party).
To contain the monopoly power in alternative 2, it is typically recommended to have a well
functioning and independent regulatory system. Less commonly recommended but highly suggested
is that, in the context of railway lines, pipelines, power lines, and fiber optics, the government retains
the right of way (or servitude) to the underlying land in order to create a corridor of infrastructure,
leveraging economies of scope.
Moreover, irrespective of a successful implementation of shared use under alternatives 1 or 2, all
user-concessions should at a minimum contain an option to be granted on a Build–Operate–Transfer
(BOT) basis so that, after a contractual period of 15-30 years, the infrastructure is transferred back to
the host government. At the end of this term, other industrial and non-industrial demands would have
8
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finally materialized, and the government will be able to make the project attractive for bidding by
third-party infrastructure concessionaires. Finally, all mining companies should be required to bid on
infrastructure plans in addition to the typical bidding criteria for a mine.

5 - The objective of this framework and its audience
Given the complexity of the issue highlighted above, CCSI has developed a framework, distilling
best practice principles from infrastructure developments around the world.
The framework, presented here, aims to provide guidance to policy makers on how to approach the
question of shared use, highlighting the operational models that are necessary for implementation,
the key success factors, the enabling conditions, and considerations on how to ultimately better
coordinate major investments in physical infrastructure by privately-owned natural resource
concessionaires with national infrastructure development plans. The framework will also equip
policy makers with a set of questions that should help conduct the negotiations on shared use with
companies. The goal of the framework is to include shared infrastructure use as part of the planning
and negotiation stages of extractive industry investments.
The framework aims to support the governments of resource-rich countries that suffer from an
infrastructure gap and have the opportunity to implement shared use on mining-related infrastructure.
It can also help civil society understand the policy-making trade-offs of shared use and inform
mining companies of their role to support sustainable development in the host countries.

6 - The scope of the framework
As seen above, the frameworks cover five types of infrastructure, namely railway lines and ports
(dealt with together as logistics infrastructure), power, water, and ICT. These infrastructure types are
considered to embody the greatest potential to fill the infrastructure gap, even though they pose
significant shared use implementation challenges. In the context of railway lines, we also consider
road infrastructure as a valuable alternative. The frameworks are presented in order from the most
challenging infrastructure type to achieve shared use (railway lines and ports) to the least challenging
type (ICT).
The frameworks have been informed by the African infrastructure context, both in terms of resource
wealth and the infrastructure gaps, but also draw on lessons learned from other continents. The
frameworks target large-scale mining investments.
Each framework sets out the steps that need to be considered by governments in order to plan for and
negotiate shared use.

9
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Given the potentially large net costs associated with the implementation of shared use in the
context of rails and port infrastructure, the rail and port framework includes a cost-benefit
analysis as step 2. The frameworks of the other infrastructure types highlight that some
shared-use projects in which the economies of scale and scope are potentially limited will also
require a cost-benefit analysis on a case-by-case basis.

7- The key definitions to understand
Brownfield versus Greenfield investments: a brownfield investment is an investment in existing
infrastructure, whereas a greenfield investment leads to the construction of new infrastructure asset
Different mining players: the mining industry is not uniform and is composed of junior mines and
senior mines with the junior ones, mostly private companies, being the risk-seekers mainly interested
in reselling their license to the more established mines.
Economies of Scale: the economies that occur when the cost per unit of output diminishes with
increasing scale of the project as fixed costs are spread out over more units of production.
Economies of Scope: in the context of a mining operation, such economies of scope arise when the
outputs of one type of infrastructure can be used as the inputs of another type of infrastructure.
Infrastructure assets: the physical infrastructure - for instance the railway lines connecting the mine
to the coastal loading point for export, ICT infrastructure, power plants and their associated
transmission lines, and waste water treatment plants and distribution lines.
Infrastructure services: the service delivered by the infrastructure asset- for instance the rail freight
carriage and/or ship loading/unloading using the infrastructure assets.
10
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Mine Investor: This is the party wishing to make the new mine development.
Multi-purpose infrastructure: an arrangement where the infrastructure asset is shared between
different uses with different characteristics (for example farmers and miners).
Multi-user infrastructure: an arrangement where the infrastructure asset is shared between
different users with similar characteristics (for example bulk miners).
PPP or public private partnership: a term used to describe a long term agreement between a
government entity and a private company, under which the private company provides, or contributes
to the provision of a public service, such as the construction and/ or operation of an infrastructure
asset, in exchange of a revenue stream generated by a government budget allocation, user fees, or a
combination of the two.
Right of way / Servitude: a type of easement granted, or reserved over the land for transportation
purposes.
Shared use: the provision of infrastructure services to both the mining investor and other parties.
These other parties can be either mineral users or non- mineral users.
Special purpose vehicle (SPV): a separate legal entity created to fulfill a narrow, specific, or
temporary objective. SPVs are typically created by companies engaging in major infrastructure
projects to ring fence the infrastructure assets from the assets of the company.
Third party access: the provision of infrastructure services by a party other than the owner of the
infrastructure asset.6

Each infrastructure type will have its own additional concepts that will be defined in each specific
section.

6

The user of the services being then either the services provider or a customer of the services provider.
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Framework 1

Shared Use of Rail and Port Infrastructure

Introduction
Increasing world demand for mineral resources has created renewed interest in mineral deposits that
were previously perceived as too risky, or insufficiently profitable to warrant investment. The highgrade iron ore deposits in Western and Central Africa, and the large-scale coking coal deposits in
Eastern Africa need major rail and port infrastructure investments to transport the ore from mine to
market and make these projects viable. With the limited financial capacity of host governments,
mining investors are expected to fund the infrastructure, which can be as much as three times more
expensive than the costs associated with the development of the mining project itself. For the
investor willing to pay for the transport infrastructure (henceforth the “leading mining company”),
the incentive is to build rail and port capacity that will maximize its profits, is in line with its project
implementation timeline and results in a competitive advantage over other potential mining
companies in the region (henceforth the “subsequent mining companies”). Profit maximization can
provide a sufficient incentive for industry participants to reach a commercial agreement for
expediting shared investment and shared use. However, the competitive nature of the industry and
uncoordinated timelines of mining projects may result in an enclave model whereby the leading
mining company designs, builds and uses the rail and port infrastructure exclusively for its own
project. From a welfare perspective this can lead to a sub-optimal outcome if other potential users
that are willing to pay7 for the infrastructure and services are denied access. The economies of scale
of rail and port infrastructure provide scope for additional capacity at a reduced cost. The
incremental cost for additional capacity is significantly lower than the construction of a separate
railway line and port facility. The right-of-way associated with railway lines, also provide significant
opportunities for economies of scope for other types of infrastructure to be integrated or built next to
the rail tracks.
The government has a key role to play to correct the market failure when it arises, and this section
addresses the necessary steps that need to be considered to promote shared use in rail and port
infrastructure. Port and rail infrastructure have been combined, as the capacity of these two
infrastructure developments needs to be designed in parallel to provide a viable logistics solution for
the mining projects. Furthermore, there are cross-cutting regulatory and operational multi-user and
multi-purpose issues that are relevant for both infrastructure investments. Unless specified, the
regulatory and operational frameworks therefore apply to both rail and port infrastructure.

7

This willingness to pay might be based on subsidized access to the infrastructure for non-miners.
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Key Definitions
Above rail: Rolling stock and rolling stock related infrastructure such as maintenance yards and train
stations.
Below rail: Track facilities, including rail, sleepers, ballast, platforms, tunnels and bridges.
Options analysis: Comparison of benefits and costs of different rail and port investment options.
Port infrastructure: Infrastructure used by all types of vessels, such as access channel, dredged port
basin and breakwater.
Port superstructure: Infrastructure used for a particular cargo type, including terminals, storage
facilities, stackers and reclaimers.
Dry port: Inland terminal that is connected to rail and/or road infrastructure where cargos are
consolidated and stored, and where custom clearance services can be provided.
Leading Mining Company: Large-scale mining company that is the first mover in the region and
has the financial backing to build rail and port infrastructure to transport the cargo from mine to
market.
Subsequent Mining Company: Mining companies that invest in the region following the leading
mining company.

Step 1: Assessing the current situation - What is at stake?
Prior to deciding on the importance of open access for a particular railway line and/or port facility, a
government should understand how the mining and infrastructure projects align with the country’s
long-term objectives and priorities. It will also need to understand the number of players and
interests involved, as well as the importance of timing of the shared use discussions.
a) Putting the infrastructure project into perspective
The government should first determine the strategic importance of the railway and port infrastructure
by assessing how the proposed developments align with national and regional infrastructure plans.
For this purpose, the government needs to assess the potential future demand for the infrastructure in
question. If, for example, the leading mining company is proposing to build an integrated railway
line and port facility that runs through a deserted and sparsely populated region with no or little
prospects for future mining projects and/or other economic projects that could benefit from the
infrastructure, the weight associated to the benefits of open access is much lower than if the corridor
connects a resource-rich region where several mining companies are developing heavy ore or coal
mining projects and/or the railway runs through an unconnected and highly fertile region where
agriculture projects are likely to be developed as a result of access to rail and port services. For this
analysis it is important to bear in mind that only a limited amount of goods are suitable for rail
transport. These tend to be high-volume and non-perishable. The vast majority of rail transport in the
world is made up by coal & coke, other high volume and low cost minerals, iron & steel, oil &
petroleum, cement, chemicals, lumber, fertilizers, cereals & grains and soybeans.8 Furthermore,
transport distance plays an important role. Short distances are better suited for road transport, but as
distances increase, railway transportation becomes more attractive. In West Africa the World Bank

8

World Bank, “Freight Transport for Development Toolkit: Rail Freight,” (2009), available at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTRAILWAYS/Resources/515244-1268663980770/rail_freight.pdf.
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found that “railways still offer the most economical solution to transporting non-time sensitive bulk
freight on distances over 500km.”9
The potential demand for multi-use/ multi-purpose infrastructure will closely relate to the
infrastructure already in place. Competition in the railway sector could come from alternative
railway systems or the road sector. For ports, the potential demand largely depends on the services
that nearby ports offer. If, for example, the leading mining company proposes to build a dedicated
finger tip terminal nearby an existing multi-user/multi-purpose port with potential to expand, it may
not be cost effective to impose multi-purpose access to such port and build the necessary
infrastructure, but rather expand the existing port.
The infrastructure in place will also determine the competitiveness of the access tariffs. A large rail
and port network will provide users with alternative transport route options. If the operator increases
the tariffs, users can choose an alternative route (provided that this route is not managed by the same
operator). If, however, only a single railway line connects two regions, there is no pressure by the
rail operator to keep transit tariffs low. Competition from the road sector will depend on the quality
of the road network and the competitiveness among road haulage companies. Government subsidies
for diesel are further going to increase the competitiveness of road haulage.
b) Understanding the Players/Interests
Various players have opposing interests in open access discussions, which make negotiations
complicated. The government needs to map out each player’s interests and play a mediating role to
achieve the best possible outcome from an economic welfare perspective. The likely players and
interests can be summarized as follows:
Potential Players Involved in Open Access Negotiations

Government
Neighboring
Country
Government

Leading
Mining
Company

Financiers

Subsequent
Mining
Companies
Third Party
Users

9

World Bank, Review of Selected Railway Concessions in Sub-Saharan Africa (2006), available at: available at:
http://www4.worldbank.org/afr/ssatp/Resources/WorldBank-WorkingPapers/ESW-RailwayConcessions.pdf.
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Government

The government’s aim is to maximize the benefits of the extraction of its resources. However, as set
out in the introduction, different ministries within the government are likely to have varied views on
how to achieve this. While the Ministry of Finance may want to maximize tax revenues and hence
prefer the integrated logistics solution, the Ministry of Transport is likely to pursue multi-user and
multi-purpose access to achieve its mandate of improved transport infrastructure access for the
country. Prior engaging in the negotiations with the mining company, the government should agree
on the importance that is placed on the open access discussions.


Leading Mining Company

The leading mining company’s objective is to maximize the profits of its operations. If rail and port
infrastructure with sufficient capacity exist, the company will aim to access this infrastructure at the
best possible access charges and tariff rates under a long-term take or pay agreement, which
guarantees that it is allocated sufficient capacity for its mining operations. If there is a lack of
infrastructure in place and the mine site is profitable enough to warrant the infrastructure investment,
the leading mining company is likely to build the infrastructure. It will optimize the design of the
railway line and port terminal in line with the mining operation and will manage the operations under
a vertically integrated model.
There may be scope for shared infrastructure investments with another mining company if this does
not interfere with its own operations and if there is no competitive rivalry between the two investors.
The competitive nature of large mining companies should not be underestimated as explained in the
introduction of the framework. This is especially the case for transport infrastructure. If the leading
mining company is successful at denying other miners access to the rail and port infrastructure and
the alternative logistics solution is significantly more expensive or not viable, the value of the nearby
concessions are going to fall. This may allow the leading mining company to acquire these
concessions at a lower price than they would have had to pay if there were a logistics solution in
place.


Subsequent Mining Companies

Subsequent mining companies can be divided into large-scale players that have the financial capacity
to invest in alternative infrastructure of their own to make a mining project viable, and smaller
(“junior”) mining companies that do not have the financial means for such investments. The smaller
mining companies will want the infrastructure to be built at excess capacity to ensure that they can
use the infrastructure when needed. Depending on the financial resources of the mining company in
question and timeframe of the project, some may be interested in gaining an equity share in the
infrastructure investment if this guarantees them capacity on the railway line and port terminal.
Mining companies without the resources to acquire an equity share in the project will look to pay
user fees once the investment is completed. To reduce the power of the leading mining company in
the operation of the infrastructure, subsequent mining companies prefer a third party managing the
rail and port operations.
A subsequent large-scale player may be interested in sharing the infrastructure investment or
building its own logistics solution. Depending on the route of the proposed alternative transport
corridor, the government will need to assess whether it should push for a shared infrastructure
solution or multiple corridors. A single solution may benefit the government in terms of revenues
from the combined mining projects, due to the economies of scale associated with the construction of
one high volume railway line and port terminal as opposed to two with lower capacities. However,
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the alternative logistics solution may reduce the countries’ dependence of one export corridor in case
bottlenecks arise, and/or the potential for broader economic development along both corridors if
these are open access.


Third party users

Third party users are the benefactors of multi-purpose access. In the African context, these are likely
to be large-scale agriculture and forestry projects, and passengers. These do not have the financial
resources to invest in rail and port infrastructure and rely on existing infrastructure and rolling stock.
Passenger services, especially in developing countries, tend to be subsidized. These services do not
generate sufficient revenues to cover the average costs of rail and port infrastructure and often do not
even cover the marginal cost of these services. Hence these players rely on strong government
intervention and cross-subsidization.


Financiers

In the African context, it is unlikely that project finance from external lenders is going to be above
50% for large infrastructure projects.10 Financiers will assess the profitability of a project and the
likelihood that the loan will be repaid in time. For this, the financiers will look at the project sponsor,
the project economics, the risk allocation and mitigation, the performance standards on social and
environmental sustainability and the other project parties that are involved in the project. The riskier
the project, the higher the lending rates. At a certain threshold, financiers will not provide loans.
Financiers prefer the leading mining vertically integrated rail and port infrastructure model, as it
provides the most predictability. The second preferred option is where the leading mining company
and subsequent mining companies have agreed to co-finance and use the rail and port infrastructure.
It becomes riskier when non-mining players are granted access to the infrastructure, as these do not
have the same financial backing as the mining companies do, and because a multi-purpose operated
railway line becomes more complicated with lower efficiency levels (and hence reduced profits to
repay the loan). Risk is significantly higher when the users of the infrastructure are unknown at the
point of financial close. Long-term take or pay commitments by the mining companies will provide
some certainty over future incomes. If, however, excess capacity is built without knowing who will
be using it, the danger exists that the demand might never materialize, thereby harming the returns on
the investment. The worst possible scenario to raise finance for an infrastructure project is a multiuser and multi-purpose infrastructure project with unallocated capacity at the financial close.


Neighbouring country government (in case of cross-border infrastructure)

Neighboring governments will seek access to the infrastructure in order to grant the right-of-way. To
maximize the potential impact on its economy, it will push for multi-user and multi-purpose access.
Transit fees are also likely to be charged.
c) The Importance of Timing
The timing of open access negotiations is crucial. If the leading mining company knows well in
advance that it will need to provide open access on its infrastructure investments, it can take these
aspects into consideration during the feasibility studies and project design phase. It is preferable to
10

IFC, “Fostering the Development of Greenfield Mining-Related Transport Infrastructure Through Project Financing”
(April 2013), available at:
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/c019bf004f4c6ebfbd99ff032730e94e/Mine+Infra+Report+Final+Copy.pdf?MOD=
AJPERES.
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negotiate open access in parallel with the remaining mining specific negotiations, as the investor will
take all aspects into account when running its financial model that will contribute in the decision
making process of whether to move ahead with a particular project.
Imposing open access requirements later on in the negotiations when key terms of the project have
already been agreed on could harm the relationship between the government and the leading mining
company, especially if the leading mining company has been expecting sole use of its developed
infrastructure. This can have a negative impact on the perceived long-term political risk environment
of the country. Upon completion of the construction of the railway line and port facilities it is most
difficult to negotiate and impose open access, especially if the infrastructure is operating at full
capacity.
Setting a precedent for open access negotiations is also of importance. If the leading mining
company is allowed to build, own and manage a fully integrated single user transport system without
any regulatory framework in place to allow for future discussions on open access, it will be difficult
for the government to impose an open access regime on a second large scale mining operation that
also requires its own rail and port operations. The general trend has shifted from allowing mining
companies to build exclusive infrastructure projects to requiring open access. The Australian
government is increasingly pushing for multi-user access in the Pilbara and African governments are
increasingly following the recommendations of the African Mining Vision report, which highlights
the importance of leveraging mining infrastructure for broader economic development.11

Step 2: Cost -benefit analysis
A detailed cost benefit analysis is necessary for the government to decide on the importance of
negotiating open access in a particular mining related rail and port project.
a) Potential benefits of shared use


Lower capital and operating costs for miners

The realization of synergies and economies of scale decreases the transport unit cost. This in turn
will increase profit margins of the companies, thereby resulting in higher tax revenues to the
government.
 Development of otherwise “stranded assets
Enabling access to mining companies can facilitate the development of smaller, otherwise stranded
mining concessions. The development of these assets will result in additional tax revenues,
employment opportunities and linkages to the economy.


Non-mining development along the corridor

With multi-purpose access to the rail and port infrastructure, projects in other sectors may become
economically attractive. These could include large-scale agriculture, forestry and industrial projects.
With cheaper transportation options available, existing projects are also likely to expand and increase
production. This, in turn, will generate additional tax revenues and employment opportunities.
11

Glen Ireland, “Mining Infra – Case for a New Approach,” in Project Finance International Middle East & Africa
Special Report, Latham Watkins, September 2013, available at: http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/new-approachafrican-mining-infrastructure.
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Back-haulage opportunities

The return journey wagons of a mineral exporting railway line are typically empty and there may be
scope to use this capacity for imports. The shipping costs are also going to decrease significantly if
vessels carry cargo on both legs of the journey. However, back-haulage opportunities are limited to
goods that can be carried in bulk cargo vessels and in open top hopper or gondola car wagons. An
example of such synergies could be inland transportation of fertilizers.12


Regional integration

With open access, cross border infrastructure projects servicing mining companies are going to
increase trade opportunities with neighboring countries. Apart from the potential economic benefits
of such trade, cooperation will lead to regional integration and reduced risk of political confrontation
in the future. Furthermore, economies of scale can be achieved if infrastructure planning is made at
the regional rather than at the national level.
b) Potential costs and risks of shared use


Capital expenditure (assuming excess capacity availability)

The additional infrastructure and rolling stock costs associated with third party access on a railway
line will largely depend on the commodity that the third party wants to transport. If it is a commodity
with similar characteristics, the additional costs are limited to investments in a new railway spur to
the mine site with loading facilities and additional rolling stock (locomotives and wagons). Higher
incremental costs are associated with multi-purpose third party access. Additional railway spurs and
specialized loading and offloading facilities will be needed to accommodate alternative goods such
as forestry and/or agriculture products being transported on the lines. Disbursed general cargo
projects may require dry ports where trains are assembled to guarantee sufficient cargo volumes for
rail transport to be economically feasible. Furthermore, train wagons might also not be
interchangeably used for mineral and the general cargo transportation.
Passenger services on freight lines represent a further cost, as safety standards need to be higher and
stations need to be built that are separate from the freight loading and unloading facilities. Passenger
services are also likely to stop at regular intervals and travel at higher speeds than the heavy haul
railways. This makes management more complicated and can lead to a reduction of the overall
capacity of the railway line.
At the port, no additional investments are needed if there is excess capacity and another mining
company is allowed access to the terminal exporting the same commodity. The capital costs
associated with multi-purpose access will largely depend on the terminal and its handling equipment.
If the terminal is setup as a general cargo type terminal,13 other commodities could be handled if
there is a clear separation that guarantees non-contamination.14 However, large-scale iron-ore and
coal terminals will have specific loading superstructure in place with stackers, reclaimers and
12

In practice back-haulage opportunities have not materialized, as mining companies that generally own the rolling
stock, are not inclined to carry third party cargo. However, in Liberia there are discussions of transporting coal inland to
supply the proposed JSPL thermal power plant, on the return leg of the trains servicing the iron-ore mines.
13
In Beira port, for example, JSPL and Beacon Hill are currently exporting via the general cargo terminal with a truck
and skip system.
14
This is of particular importance when food commodities are handled at the same terminal as minerals as coal dust, for
example, can contaminate the food.
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conveyor belt systems reducing vessel-loading time. At such terminal, it is not possible to handle
other types of commodities. For multi-purpose access in such situation, the construction of separate
terminals will be required. Associated costs may include dredging to expand the basin, building
berths, storage facilities and investing in new handling equipment. In extreme cases, the provision
for multi-purpose access for a proposed greenfield port may require a completely different design of
the port infrastructure with significant additional costs.


Costs associated with increasing the capacity

Rail capacity is not a rigid, linear concept. If well-managed, occasional passenger and general cargo
trains could run in between the larger mineral trains without disrupting the schedule or service. In
such cases, capacity access may not pose additional costs (if the necessary rolling stock and
infrastructure for these alternative services is in place). If the port in question has general cargo and
passenger terminals, a small increase in port throughput is also not going to intervene with the
mining operations.
Significant third party access allocation, on the other hand, will demand further infrastructure
investments. On the railway line, costs could include increasing the number of loops and sidings,
reinforcing the tracks and bridges and/or expanding the railway line to a double track system. At the
port, increased capacity might be associated with the terminal expansion and the construction of
additional terminals. This may also demand general port infrastructure investments such as dredging
the port access channel in order to be able to handle larger vessels.


Efficiency loss

Operating one vertically integrated customer from mine to rail to port to ship is easier than if several
users need to be accommodated. For the Goonyella mine associated infrastructure, for example,
O’Donnel estimates that operational efficiency of a multi-user rail and port system would be 10-20%
below a single-user model.15 This efficiency loss is further increased when multi-purpose goods are
granted access to the railway line. Passenger services, for example, generally travel at different
speeds and stop at regular intervals. This multi-purpose efficiency loss is not necessarily observed at
ports, as other commodities and passenger services will not be anchoring at the mineral terminal.


Access to Finance

As outlined in the “Understanding the player/interests” section, it will be easier to access finance
under the single-user model. Multi-user and multi-purpose access increases the difficulty to obtain
financing, especially if the end-users are unknown at the point of financial close.


Delay of Negotiations

The additional commercial complexity in negotiating with multiple users, and the additional
technical design needed to accommodate more users risks delaying the project schedule. 16 This, in
turn, will delay government revenues from the leading mining company and could ultimately result
in the cancellation of the project.


Costs of regulatory body to supervise shared use

15

Stephen O’Donnel,”Goonyella Coal Chain Capacity Review - letter,” July 29, 2007, available at:
http://www.tmr.qld.gov.au/business-industry/Transport-sectors/Rail-services-and-infrastructure/Goonyella-Coal-ChainCapacity-Review.aspx
16
Each additional major negotiating party will increase negotiation complexity.
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Any government mandate for shared use beyond a mere facilitation role requires a regulatory body
with an adequate operating budget. The box below outlines the tasks and characteristics of such
regulatory body. The more interventionist the regulating body, the more important it is that it
functions properly and is well funded.
Regulatory Body Tasks
Regulate tariffs: The operator needs to charge sufficiently high fees to recoup the investment, cover
operational and maintenance costs, and make a reasonable profit margin. However, the operator
should not benefit from excessive profits as a result of its monopoly power. A reference tariff could
be published by the operator, which serves as a baseline for negotiations with users. After agreeing to
the reference tariff, the regulatory body could impose margins, above and below which the operator
cannot negotiate. The mechanisms and standards to calculate the reference tariff should be objective
and transparent.
Guarantee non-discrimination: The leading mining company and financiers/guarantors of the
infrastructure development will require priority access on a pre-agreed amount of capacity. However,
there should be a level playing field as to how this capacity is allocated, be it among the existing
infrastructure users or new entrants. Clear access conditions need to be established and adhered to,
and the regulator will need to define the information that must be made available by the operator.
Furthermore, transparent arbitration mechanisms should be established to ensure enforcement of the
access allocations and to regulate disputes. The infrastructure operator and access seeker need to be
aware of the procedures and guaranteed equal treatment in arbitrations.
Define access charges: In case there is a separation of the infrastructure operator from the
infrastructure owner, the latter will require access charges for the use of its infrastructure (and in turn
the infrastructure operator will charge tariffs to the end user). The calculation of access charges can
be divided into marginal cost pricing, which covers the maintenance costs associated with the
service, and average cost pricing, which also includes the original construction costs of the
infrastructure. The regulatory body may impose different calculation methodologies for different
services.
Guarantee infrastructure investments: The regulator should be able to require capacity expansion
if there is sufficient contracted demand. The tariff and access charges should reflect such additional
investments.
Standards: The regulatory body should ensure that the safety, environmental and technical
regulations are adhered to by all rail users and owners of infrastructure.
Characteristics of regulator
Information asymmetry: The owner and operator of the rail and port infrastructure have a better
understanding of the costs involved. These are not easily auditable. Therefore significant expertise
and experience is necessary within the regulatory body to monitor tariffs and access charges.
Governments that do not have the expertise should seek foreign expertise until the necessary capacity
is built up.
Independence: The regulatory body should be independent from the government, mining companies
and operators to guarantee neutrality and a fair judgment. Where such independence is not present, a
transitional regulatory system is needed, which might have to rely on the juridical system and/or an
international dispute settlement board. The level of intervention of the regulator should be
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proportional to its maturity and independence.
Clear decision-making process: To guarantee independent, consistent rulings in disputes, and to
gain the trust of the private sector, clear technical guidelines should be outlined upon which
decisions are made.
c) Options analysis
If several rail and port options are discussed, the government should make a cost-benefit analysis for
each option. This options analysis should also include the possibility of investments in infrastructure
that is unrelated to the mining project (for example, it might be more cost effective for the
government to capitalize on higher tax revenues from the mining project and invest in a road
alongside the railway track, or expand an existing multi-purpose port rather than insisting on the
construction of a separate terminal at a proposed greenfield mineral port). The government should
always keep in mind the impact that different routes and open access requests will have on the
logistics costs for the leading mining company. Above a certain threshold the mining project itself
might become unviable.

Step 3: Identifying operational synergies and verifying the necessary
preconditions for shared use
There is no “one-size fits all” operational model for port and rail infrastructure. The strategic
importance of the infrastructure projects in question will define the government’s initial stance on
multi-user and multi-purpose access. By understanding the interests at play, the government will be
able to gauge what the likelihood is that open access is achieved without significant intervention.
The figure below sets out a number of different scenarios that may arise from the above analysis. The
red arrow indicates that with increasing benefits associated with open access and a larger number of
players involved in the open access discussions, there is an increasingly important role for the
government to play and intervene, as the market is unlikely to provide the socially optimal outcome.
Government intervention depends on the benefits/costs associated with open access
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The remaining section will discuss each scenario and propose design and operational models, as well
as the necessary regulatory framework and level of intervention that might be best suited for each to
guarantee open access and non-discrimination.
1. Little foreseen economic benefit from open access


Design and Operational Model

Such a scenario would result from no other present or future economically feasible mining projects
being located in the region (even if these had access to rail and port services), little potential for
projects along the corridor that could benefit from multi-purpose access, and the corridor being
located in a sparsely populated area, thereby not generating potential use for trade or a passenger
service. The economic benefit of imposing open access could also be limited if existing nearby rail
and port infrastructure already provide multi-user and/or multi-purpose services and there is scope to
increase capacity on this alternative infrastructure at a lower cost.
In such case it is best to let the leading mining company finance, own and manage the vertically
integrated rail and port infrastructure to maximize efficiency along the corridor. The mining
company may choose to operate the infrastructure facilities itself or contract a service provider for
these purposes. The leading mining company will design and manage the rail and port infrastructure
to maximize profits of its mining operation, which in turn will lead to higher corporate taxes being
paid to the government.


Regulatory Framework and Level of Intervention

Since there is little value added by imposing open access or insist on increased capacity on such
infrastructure project and/or monitor the access and transport tariffs in the foreseeable future, the
government should not intervene.
Instead, the government should focus on regulatory provisions that would allow for
renegotiations in case there is access demand for the infrastructure in the future. Blanket open
access regimes such as the one in Australia, encompass all sectors of the economy, but are only
likely to be applied in key sectors that are of strategic significance and where monopolistic behavior
and abuse of market power is likely to occur (such as in port and railway services). The regime sets
out the conditions under which the government will consider breach to open access. Conditions in
Australia include that (1) it is not economically feasible to duplicate the infrastructure in question,
(2) access to the infrastructure in question is necessary to permit effective competition, (3) the
infrastructure in question is of strategic national importance to the national economy, (4) the
infrastructure in question can be used by the third party at an economically feasible cost without
increasing health and safety risks, and (5) access is not already subject to an effective regime. Similar
conditions can be included in industry specific access regimes, which are tailored for a particular
sector. Such regulation should not only apply to competing companies (as is the case in the USA),
but also to other sectors of the economy that might benefit from access to the infrastructure (as is the
case in Australia). If the third party can prove the conditions set out in the access regime, the
government can act as a negotiating facilitator between the infrastructure owner/operator and the
third party. If these negotiations do not result in agreement, the government should be able to
intervene to guarantee access under reasonable tariffs.
Blanket or industry specific regulatory regimes need to be clearly drafted on objective criteria in
order to be effective. In the case of Australia, the “not economically feasible” creates room for
interpretation and also imposes an unnecessary burden. If increasing the capacity on an existing
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railway line or port terminal to guarantee multi-user access is less costly than building a separate
line/terminal, this should be sufficient to impose multi-user access, even if it is economically feasible
to build a second line/terminal. Furthermore, these regulations should not be softened or contradicted
in the contract with the leading mining company. In the case of Australia, Rio Tinto has been able to
deny third party access in Pilbara,17 because it argued that third party access would prejudice or
interfere with its operations, which was a clause included in its contract.
If the leading mining company also concludes that there is no economic benefit from open access
and therefore little risk of a third party aiming to acquire access to the infrastructure in the
foreseeable future, it should not be deterred by such regulation. If, however, the company does voice
concerns about the regulation, the government could include an “access holiday” clause with an
expiration date in the contract (also known as a sunset clause). Such clauses guarantee that the
infrastructure in question is not subject to any access regulation during an agreed timeframe. Both
the Camrail and Sitarail concessions in West Africa contain such clauses for five and seven years
respectively.18 The inclusion of such a clause could also be a clear signal that at the expiration date,
third party access renegotiations are a possibility if the economic situation changes and there is a
third party interested in accessing the railway line and port facility. The length of the access holiday
could be linked to the profitability of the mining project. This would guarantee that the leading
mining company recoups its investment prior potential third party access.
Even if the government grants the mining company ownership and management of the railway line,
the government should always retain the right-of-way, as this reserved land on either side of the
railway tracks should be considered a public good and can serve non-mining related infrastructure
investments. For example, the right-of-way can be leveraged to lay power and telecommunication
lines. The installation of such infrastructure along an existing rail corridor is significantly less than
building it along a separate route and also maximizes the use of existing land reserved for
transport/transmission infrastructure. If there is significant demand to use the right-of-way for nonrail infrastructure, the government could tender the management of the right-of-way to a third party
with clear goals and targets.
2. Mining companies willing to share infrastructure. Little further foreseen economic
benefit from multi-purpose access.


Design and operational model

If there is a mutual net benefit for shared use of mining companies in the region and there is no
foreseeable additional capacity needed on the line, the government should aim to avoid playing an
interventionist role but rather act as an intermediary between the stakeholders. The mining
companies may choose to invest in proportion to the capacity allocation.
To maximize the efficiency of the operations, the government could negotiate for the rail operation
to be managed by one entity under a haulage regime. Under a haulage regime the operator not
only manages the access to the tracks or ‘below rail’ logistics, but also provides the rolling stock to
the mining companies and charges for the services accordingly. The haulage services could either be
performed by the leading mining company or a third party operator. This decision should be left to
17

Perrine Toledano, “Leveraging Extractive Industry Infrastructure Investments for Broad Economic Development:
Regulatory, Commercial and Operational Models for Railways and Ports,” (May 2012), Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment, Columbia University, available at: http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/05/CCSI-Policy-Paper-LeveragingMining-Related-Rails-and-Ports-for-Development-May-20121.pdf
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World Bank, “Review of Selected Railway Concessions in Sub-Saharan Africa,” op.cit.
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the negotiations between the mining companies. While haulage regimes have not been tested in
practice (one is being considered in Mongolia to export coal to China),19 the advantage of such
regime compared to the more common access regime where each mining company provides its own
rolling stock, results from economies of scale in acquisition, lower maintenance costs and higher
effectiveness in operations. It also reduces the operational risks of different operators on the line in
case of rolling stock failure.20 Higher efficiency in the rail operations may increase the bankability of
the project.


Regulatory framework and level of intervention

Unless there are complaints by one of the mining companies and there are no further players wanting
to access the railway line and/or port terminal, the government should not intervene. As in the
previous scenario, the legal framework should ensure that if the economic prospects in the region
change and there is potential for further parties to claim access, there are mechanisms in place that
could address such issues (clearly drafted blanket or sector specific access regimes).
Example: Mining companies willing to share infrastructure – Marampa-Pepel Corridor
African Minerals (AML) was awarded to mine the Tonkolili iron ore deposit in Sierra Leone in
2009. As part of the agreement, AML was granted a 99-year exclusive infrastructure lease to
reconstruct, manage and operate the Marampa – Pepel railway line and Pepel port.
In 2012, AML signed a binding heads of agreement with Cape Lambert, which grants its Marampa
Iron Ore subsidiary access to the infrastructure. The agreement foresees that Cape Lambert funds
33% of the costs of the Marampa-Pepel Infrastructure upgrade in return for an equal share in the
project. This would guarantee Cape Lambert 2mpta capacity allocation on the railway line
(excluding rolling stock) and to the unloading, stockpiling and transshipping facilities at Pepel port.21
Cape Lambert’s exposure included a cap of $45million. It has been reported that the service is to be
at a cost plus 20% basis and Cape Lambert must design and construct its own 3km rail spur line to
African Minerals rail line on its own.22
3. High concerns over stranded mining assets without government intervention, but little
further foreseen economic benefits resulting from multi-purpose access.


Design and operational model

Given the competitive dynamics between mining companies, the emphasis of the operational model
should lie on guaranteeing that the infrastructure is built to accommodate additional capacity and that
tariffs are non-discriminatory. To guarantee the latter, the most effective mechanism available to the
government is to separate the ownership of the infrastructure from the mining companies. This
separation should include both rail and port infrastructure. In South Africa, the railway line to
19

IFC, “Fostering the Development of Greenfield Mining-Related Transport Infrastructure Through Project Financing,”
(2013) op cit.
20
Ibid.
21
“REG - African Minerals Ltd - Agreement on Marampa/Pepel Infrastructure,” Reuters, 16 July 2010, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/16/idUS125485+16-Jul-2010+RNS20100716
22
“Cape Lambert Resources: Marampa update, “Fat Prophets, April 2012, available at:
http://www.fatprophets.com/Member%20Area/Product%20Landing/Report%20List/Report%20Page/Article%20Page.as
px?id=b07f54d5-1731-4f39-a008-0943c98926a7&product=Australasian%20Mining&pt=paid.
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Richards Bay is open access, but the coal terminal is company-owned. The latter has rejected
allocating capacity to smaller mining companies seeking access, 23 which has made open access on
the railway line irrelevant. To avoid such capacity and access problems, it is best for the same entity
to manage both the railway line and port terminal. Apart from simplifying the access and tariff
negotiations and ensuring that the same capacities are being allocated, this system will increase
efficiency along the corridor. It will also be easier to obtain project financing for an infrastructure
project with fewer players.
To separate the ownership, a special purpose vehicle (SPV) could be setup, which owns and
operates the rail and port infrastructure.24 To finance the investment, the SPV will have to be
backed by long-term take or pay agreements at set tariff rates that the mining companies guarantee to
pay. This will set out the flow of revenues to the SPV upon completion of the infrastructure. With
such agreement in place, it will be easier to source project financing. As principal backing agency for
the SPV through its take or pay commitment, the leading mining company is likely to require
founding rights such as priority access.
With extensive mineral deposits known to be economically viable with access to rail and port
infrastructure, the government can also explore the scope for tendering and awarding the
construction and management of the rail and port infrastructure concession to a third party.
As with the SPV arrangement, the third party will need long-term take or pay commitments to be
able to raise the necessary capital for the infrastructure investments. However, awarding the rail and
port concession to a third party (rather than to the leading mining company) could result in higher
tariffs being charged to the users because: (1) hurdle rates are likely to be higher if the cost centers
are separated, with uncertainty increasing for the mining company not having control over the export
infrastructure and the infrastructure concessionaire depending on the mining company for the project
to be viable in the first place, and (2) large-scale mining companies can rely on their balance sheets
to either directly finance the infrastructure project or use it as a guarantee to access project finance at
low interest rates, but third party logistics companies are unlikely to have such financial muscle. The
associated increase in risk due to separation of ownership will further increase interest rates being
charged to finance the project
Example: Tendering mining-related rail and port infrastructure project to a third party –
Tete-Macuse corridor
To provide a logistics solution for the mining companies that have invested in coal concessions in
Tete, the Government of Mozambique launched an international tender for the construction of the
525km long Zambezi corridor, which connects Moatize with a greenfield port at Macuse. The tender
foresees the design, finance, construction, management and operation of the rail and port
infrastructure and requires multi-user and multi-purpose access.25 It has been reported that 21
companies applied for the tender and 6 preferred bidders were selected to submit full bids. 26 Italthai
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engineering was officially announced to have been awarded the tender in December 2013 27 and will
be seeking off-take agreements with the mining companies to finance the project. While the number
of bids suggests that there is great interest for such PPP project, which is estimated to cost around
US$3.5bn, there have been concerns that the bidders have struggled to provide the bank guarantees
that were demanded by the Government. 28
There may be scope for negotiations to build the rail and port infrastructure marginally above
capacity to take into account potential operational inefficiencies. However, mining companies are not
inclined to finance capacity that they will not use. If the SPV and/or third party can make a good case
to financiers that additional capacity is needed, this could be a viable alternative to guarantee excess
capacity. If the government is certain that excess capacity will be needed, it can provide funding
itself. However, this is a risky strategy if the future mining projects do not materialize. Instead, the
government could require the infrastructure to be designed in such way that future capacity
expansion is possible. Such clause has been included in the Putu contract, where “the railroad shall
be designed so that it can be expanded on a commercially feasible basis to carry on a continuing
basis twice as much traffic as is anticipated initially…”29 A similar design clause could be included
for port infrastructure, which guarantees that the site selection offers potential to increase the
capacity of the mineral terminal.
While the haulage regime has the potential to increase efficiency along the corridor as explained in
the previous scenario, and it would also guarantee that smaller mining companies that do not have
the financial means to purchase rolling stock have access to the railway line, the additional cost of
the rolling stock will have to be carried by the SPV or third party.


Regulatory framework and level of intervention

If the leading mining company is reluctant to allow multi-user access and there is a high likelihood
of stranded assets, the government can play a lead role in requiring the players to come up with a
shared solution. Softer pressures can be applied. The construction of port and rail infrastructure
involves numerous areas where the government can assist, including, for example, access to land,
resettlement approval and environmental permits. These can be granted upon agreement by the
industry to cooperate on the infrastructure development.
Another option to increase the government’s influence on the port and rail infrastructure project is to
co-finance the investment by acquiring an equity stake. This reduces the financial burden on the
government compared to full state ownership30 and provides it with influencing opportunities within
the SPV/PPP. However, raising the financial resources for paying for the equity might be a challenge
-for countries with small budgets and high political risk ratings. Resource-for infrastructure deals
have been one methodology used by governments to raise finance for such large-scale infrastructure
investments, but those deals require a detailed financial analysis to ensure that the resources are not
given away for a below-market value.
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“Terms of lease on Macuse port, railway agreed,” Club of Mozambique, December 5, 2013, available at:
http://www.clubofmozambique.com/solutions1/sectionnews.php?secao=business&id=30776&tipo=one
28
“Mozambique: Thai Company At Advantage in Bidding for New Railway, ”AllAfrica, August 4, 2013, available at:
http://allafrica.com/stories/201308050439.html
29
World Bank, “Leveraging Investments by Natural Resource Concessionaires,” op cit.
30
Full state ownership could be considered in countries with large budgets, but even there PPPs have been preferred in
the past, as governments have not been very successful at managing large scale infrastructure projects.
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The government could also require a golden share to influence the decision-making process in
strategic public interest infrastructure projects. A golden share is a nominal share conferring special
voting rights that are established by law. It is typically a single share granting its owner sufficient
voting rights to block board decisions. It is not attached to dividend rights as opposed to the equity
above. The rights of a golden share can vary in scope and duration and range from a limited veto
right to the need to consent to everyday management decisions. The golden share allows
governments a controlling interest despite limited investment. This can be an efficient policy tool to
influence open access decisions of port and rail infrastructure, but the leading mining company may
not be willing to invest in the infrastructure if it does not have managing authority over it upon
completion.
With significantly higher risks of discrimination in access in this scenario, the government will need
to focus its attention on setting up regulatory mechanisms and/or an independent regulatory
body31 (apart from drafting blanket and/or sector specific access regulations). An independent
regulator is preferable to relying on the judicial system, which is lengthier, less predictable, does not
provide a long-term compliance monitoring, and relies on judges that are less likely to know about
the rail and port sector.
While the tasks and responsibilities of the regulatory body should be set out in the legislation, the
level of intervention should be adapted to the maturity of the regulator and the competitive nature of
the railway line/port terminal. With vertical separation between the mining companies and
infrastructure owners and only mineral commodities being transported along the corridor, the
regulator should closely supervise and monitor, but not aim to intervene in setting access charges and
tariffs. It will also need to arbitrate cases that are put forward by third parties. If, on the other hand,
the leading mining company also owns the rail and port infrastructure, stronger intervention may be
necessary to guarantee that multi-user access is adhered to.
Example: Setting up a regulatory authority for railways - Mozambique
On August 12, 2011, the Government of Mozambique approved the National Surface Transport
Regulator (INATTER), which has the mandate to regulate the rail and road transport. For the railway
sector, the regulator has the competency to:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.

Propose railway related legislative and regulatory measures to be approved by the
government
Regulate the railway infrastructure construction and ensure that access of operators is
non-discriminatory
Monitor that applicable regulatory laws, licenses and concession agreements are adhered
to
Determine the introduction of technical improvements to increase the safety and
efficiency of rail transport
Analyse complaints by rail operators and arbitrate accordingly
Regulate the access to rail infrastructure and arbitrate accordingly
Guarantee and monitor the rights and interests of railway users

While INATTER creates a mechanism for third parties to be able to seek access to rail infrastructure,
31

The decision of whether to create a new institution or regulate through existing government entities will depend on the
country context, particularly whether there is expertise to staff the new entity and whether the independence of the entity
can be guaranteed (see box on the Regulatory Body Tasks).
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the fact that it is an entity within the Ministry of Transport and Communications, where the Minister
appoints key personnel, poses uncertainty for the infrastructure owners that the arbitration process
will be neutral and based on an independent assessment. It also remains to be seen whether
INATTER has the political backing and technical capacity to impose its regulatory authority on the
powerful state owned rail company, which has been in charge of setting tariffs on rail traffic in the
past. The UK Department for International Development (DfID), which has supported the Ministry
of Transport and Communications in setting up INATTER, has recognized these challenges and
views “turning INATTER into a robust and independent regulatory body as a medium to long term
endeavour.”32

4. High potential to unlock economic development along the corridor


Design and operational model

As set out in the cost benefit analysis (step 2), multi-purpose access to rail requires additional
infrastructure investments such as dry ports, loading and off-loading facilities, and is likely to make
the corridor less efficient. Similarly, greenfield ports that are required to cater for additional nonmineral terminals will require significant additional investments. These will not be voluntarily
financed by the mining sector and therefore the government will need to either finance the additional
investments directly, through a loan with the investor, through a financier, an international
development agency, or through tax offsets.
While agriculture and passenger services are unlikely to take up significant amounts of capacity
compared to the mineral cargo that makes the construction of a railway line feasible in the first place,
double track rail systems can decrease the operational bottlenecks. In case there is sufficient
capacity to warrant such investment, the government should push for a double track rail system or
require it in the tender. Double track avoids the operational complexities of having to carefully
coordinate inbound and outbound trains. This will result in trains being able to haul more wagons,
travel at higher speeds and lower operational costs. The construction of a double track system is
estimated to be 24% cheaper in the case of the Buchanan corridor in Liberia if 36mtpa of iron-ore
were to be transported on a double track railway system compared to two single-track lines.33 Such
system also allows for higher travelling speeds for passenger services.
In case multi-purpose access comes at a significant cost and there is a lack of road infrastructure in
place, the government could also negotiate for the service road of the railway line to be designed
and built to accommodate road haulage and passenger transport.


Regulatory framework and level of intervention

To guarantee multi-purpose access on a railway line that is built to service the mining sector, the
government will not only have to monitor and ensure non-discriminatory access, but will also have to
define the tariff setting mechanism. This is especially the case for more price sensitive cargoes
such as agriculture products and passenger services. Public Service Obligation (PSO) schemes have
been used in Africa in the past to warrant for passenger services. These involve the government
subsidizing passenger rail services. However, the track record of these agreements is unstable, due to
32
33

DfID, “Mozambique Regional Gateway Programme Review,” (March 2013).
World Bank, “Leveraging Investments by Natural Resource Concessionaires,” op.cit
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governments not paying out the subsidies in practice. This has created a system where even if the
government were to guarantee the subsidy during the negotiations, the investors are wary that this
agreement might not be upheld due to the lack of long-term credibility.34
An alternative in such circumstances could be to contractually require price discrimination and
cross-subsidization between the higher-profit mining industry and the price-sensitive
agriculture sector/passenger services. For example, price-sensitive services could be charged at
marginal cost, which will cover the operations of the service, but not the infrastructure investments;
whereas the mining related services are charged at average cost plus the difference of the pricesensitive services.35
To ensure that tariffs are set by the operator in such a way that guarantee price-sensitive goods and
passenger services to be transported on the railway line, the government could impose a more
interventionist monitoring system whereby the regulator needs to pre-approve the tariffs that the
operator wants to charge. This system has been adopted by EFVM railway in Brazil. However, as
highlighted above, such system should only be considered if the regulator is independent and has the
capacity to be involved in such an interventionist manner.
5. Cross-border potential to increase trade and unlock economic development along the
corridor


Design and operational model

Apart from requiring negotiations with the leading mining company, cross-border infrastructure
projects will also require negotiations with the neighboring country government. These negotiations
involve political, managerial and technical decision-making.
On the technical side, the governments and the mining companies need to agree on the design of the
railway infrastructure. If the railway line is purely designed for high volume ore/coal transportation,
wider gauges (distance between the inner surfaces of the rail) might be the preferred choice by the
mining company, as this setup can carry heavier loads while travelling at faster speeds. However, if
the proposed project is meant to connect to the existing rail networks in the region, it makes sense to
build the railway gauge accordingly. Different gauge settings between the two countries could lead
to a significant increase in transport costs with transshipping or gauge changes becoming necessary
at the border.
On the managerial front, governments need to agree on the border management system. Long delays
at the border due to lengthy customs controls, predatory officials, and/or the necessity to change
crews and locomotives at borders will result in inefficiencies. It is therefore recommended that an
integrated border management system is put in place and that customs procedures are
streamlined.
An additional stakeholder in the negotiations and the associated increase in political risk due to cross
border transportation is likely to result in increased difficulties to source funding. For regional
integration projects, multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and/or the African Development
Bank can be considered to help with the financing.
34

Paul Collier, “Building an African infrastructure”, 48(4) Finance & Development (2011), available at:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2011/12/collier.htm.
35
Paul Collier, “Building an African infrastructure,” op cit.
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Regulatory framework and level of intervention

For the mining leading company to feel comfortable to invest in a cross border infrastructure project,
it needs to be sure that political tensions between the countries will not result in disruptions to its
services. A tri-partite agreement that establishes the binding nature of the provisions that are
agreed on should be signed. This should include the type of goods that will be transported on the
line, the principle of transit cargo and the open access rules. These agreements should be embedded
in both domestic and international law. An intergovernmental rail authority could help supervise
the tariff structure and pricing mechanisms of non-mineral services.
Example: Potential cross-country logistics solution – Guinea/Liberia
Liberia has significant iron ore deposits under development on the border to Guinea. ArcelorMittal is
rehabilitating the 250km railway line from Yekepa to Buchanan and developing the iron ore terminal
at Buchanan port to a capacity of 15mpta. This corridor could also serve as a potential logistics
solution for the iron ore deposits on the Guinean side, including the Nimba, Diake, Belekoyo and
Simandou deposits.36 The shortest route through Guinea for the Simandou deposit is Conakry, which
is 800km away, as compared to 350km to the port of Buchanan in Liberia. 37 The World Bank
estimates that that the cost savings of going through Liberia are roughly US$1 billion over a twentyyear period (US$3.49 per tonne via Conakry versus US$1.22 per tonne via Buchanan) when the full
lifecycle costs of running the two alternative railroads are taken into account. Furthermore, Vale
states that the deep-sea waters (>28m), which are critical to the use of its Valemax vessels, are at a
2km to 3km distance from the Liberian shore in comparison to a 15km to 20km distance in Guinea.38
While the Guinean Government has required Rio Tinto to export the Simandou deposits via Guinea,
it has signed bilateral agreement with Liberia to allow companies mining the Nimba deposit to use
the Liberian transport route. It has recently been reported that Sable Mining, a concession holder of
the Nimba iron ore project in South-West Guinea, has been granted an export license authorizing the
transport of iron ore through the Port of Buchanan.39 The company is seeking to initially transport
5mtpa via the existing railway line of ArcelorMittal.40

36

Depending on which concessions are developed, it may be necessary to build an additional corridor, as iron-ore
quantities would exceed what is feasible on a double track railway line.
37
World Bank, “Leveraging Investments by Natural Resource Concessionaires,” op.cit
38
BSR Resources: http://www.bsgresources.com/mining-and-metals/iron-ore/.
39
Natalie Greve, “Nimba export license in line with Guinea Liberia Agreement – Sable,” Mining Weekly, October
11,2013, available at: http://www.miningweekly.com/article/nimba-export-licence-in-line-with-guinea-liberiaagreement-sable-2013-10-11.
40
“Sable Mining confident will export iron ore through Liberia” Reuters, September 18, 2013, available at:
http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/sable-mining-confident-export-iron-175800928.html .
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STEP 4: Negotiating points
Having understood the importance and potential impact of multi-user and multi-purpose access, the government will need to prepare its
negotiating strategy. The strategy will highly depend on the particular set of circumstances it is confronted with. The table below provides a nonexclusive list of the key negotiation points depending on the scenarios addressed above.
Scenario

Preferred
Model

Regulatory
Operating Framework/
Government
Intervention

Benefits

Risks

Key Negotiating Points

 Access holidays
1. Single mine, little
 Blanket or sector  Maximize efficiency  Difficult to guarantee  Open access guarantee
foreseen
economic  Vertically integrated
specific open access
of mining project and capacity and access to after termination of
model from pit-tobenefit
from
open
regimes
thereby government third parties in the access holidays
port
access
revenues
future
 Non-interventionist
 Reserve right-of-way
2.
Joint
agreed
investment by mining
companies,
little  SPV
foreseen benefit from  Haulage regime
open access beyond
those users

 Access holidays
 Open access guarantee
 Blanket or sector
 Difficult to guarantee after termination of
 Maximize government
specific open access
capacity and access to access holidays
revenues from mining
regimes
third
non-financing  Reserve right-of-way
sector in the region
parties in the future
 Non-interventionist
 Haulage regime by
miner or third party

 Unlocking the mining
potential of the region  Delay in negotiations
 SPV or third party  Blanket or sector
specific open access  Higher
operated
government with leading mining
regimes
infrastructure
model
revenues
as
a result of company
3. Danger of stranded
(vertically
separated)
 Equity or golden
the development of  Delay in government
mining assets, little
share
of
government
smaller
mining revenues from leading

Haulage
regime
or
foreseen benefit from
projects
mining company
access
regime
 Independent
multi-purpose access
(depending
on
regulatory body for  Additional
 Difficulty to negotiate
financing
and
monitoring
and
employment
financing
for
the
maturity of regulator)
arbitration
opportunities
and project
linkages to the mining
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 Reserve right-of-way
 Cooperation
among
mining companies
 Capacity for existing
mining projects
 Capacity for potential
future mining projects
 Capacity
expansion
design & priority
access/ founding rights
for leading mining
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Scenario

Preferred
Model

Regulatory
Operating Framework/
Government
Intervention

Benefits

Risks

sector

4. Danger of stranded
mining assets, high
potential for unlocking
economic potential with
multi-user and multipurpose access

 Blanket or sector
 SPV or third party
specific open access
operated model
regimes
 Haulage regime or  Equity or golden
access
regime
share of government
(depending
on  Independent
financing
and
regulatory body for
maturity of regulator)
monitoring,
tariffoversight
and
arbitration

 Unlocking the mining
potential of the region
 Higher
government
revenues as a result of
the development of
smaller
mining
projects
 Additional
employment
opportunities
and
linkages to the mining
sector
 Attract
non-mining
related
investment
along the corridor,
which is likely to be
more labour intensive
 Increased trade along
the corridor
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Key Negotiating Points

customer
 Double track design of
railway

 Delay in negotiations
with leading mining
company
 Delay in government
revenues from leading
and subsequent mining
companies
 Leading
mining
company abandoning
project
 Difficulty to acquire
financing
for
the
project
 Loss of efficiency on
the railway line
 Uncertainty of whom
will finance the nonmining
related
infrastructure

 Reserve right-of-way
 Cooperation
with
subsequent
mining
companies
 Capacity for existing
mining projects
 Capacity for potential
future mining projects
 Capacity for nonmining projects
 Double track design of
railway
 Open access to service
road for non-mineral
cargo
 Financing of nonmining
related
infrastructure
 Capacity
expansion
design & priority
access for foundation
customer
 Cross-subsidization
 Open access service
road
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Scenario

5.
Cross-border
potential increase trade
and to unlock economic
development along the
corridor

Preferred
Model

Regulatory
Operating Framework/
Government
Intervention

Benefits

 SPV or third party
 Tri-party agreement
operated model
that sets out the open
 Haulage regime or
access regime
access
regime
 Intergovernmental
(depending
on
railway
authority
maturity of regulator)
involved in tariff
 Integrated
border
oversight
management system

 Unlocking the mining
potential of the region
 Higher
government
revenues as a result of
the development of
smaller
mining
projects
 Additional
employment
opportunities
and
linkages to the mining
sector
 Attract
non-mining
related
investment
along the corridor,
which is likely to be
more labour intensive
 Increased trade along
the corridor
 Regional integration
 Lower capital and
operational costs if
cross border route is
shorter
than
alternative
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Risks

Key Negotiating Points

 Delay in negotiations
with leading mining
company
 Delay in government
revenues from leading
and subsequent mining
companies
 Leading
mining
company abandoning
project
 Difficulty to acquire
financing
for
the
project
 Loss of efficiency on
the railway line
 Uncertainty of whom
will finance the nonmining
related
infrastructure

 Reserve right-of-way
 Cooperation
with
subsequent
mining
companies
 Capacity for existing
mining projects
 Capacity for potential
future mining projects
 Capacity for nonmining projects
 Double track design of
railway or service road
utilization for nonmineral cargo
 Financing of nonmining
related
infrastructure
 Capacity
expansion
design
 Cross-subsidization
 Transit fee negotiation
with
neighbouring
government
 Integrated
border
management system
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The table above shows what has been raised at the beginning of the rail and port section of
the framework: The more players that are involved, the more points need to be addressed in
the negotiations and the more complex they become. How strongly the government
should/can push on each negotiation point will depend on the cost-benefit analysis, the
viability of the mining project under a shared-use agreement, and on the willingness of the
company to accept these conditions. The government should assess its leverage prior entering
the negotiations. This will depend on the characteristics of the mining concession (quality and
profitability), market conditions, the costs imposed on companies in competing mining
jurisdictions, the likelihood that another mining company will buy the concession and build
the infrastructure in question if negotiations fail, and the ease of finding a financier for the
project. Ultimately, the legal arrangements of a mining related infrastructure agreement will
be the reflection of what is financially doable, rather than the other way around. 41 Any shared
use agreement will require the government to provide the leading mining company with
founding rights to guarantee its capacity is secured on the infrastructure for the length of the
agreement.

41

Please refer to the IFC (2013): “Fostering the Development of Greenfield Mining-Related Transport
Infrastructure Through Project Financing” report to get a better understanding of the viewpoint of financiers
when it comes to provide funding for large scale rail and port infrastructure investments related to mining
projects.
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Framework 2
Shared Use in the context of Power
Introduction
According to the World Bank’s Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic, Africa’s largest
infrastructure deficit lies in the power sector, whether it is measured in terms of generation
capacity, electricity consumption or security of supply. The power generation capacity of the
48 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (with a combined population of 800 million) roughly
equates to the power generation capacity of Spain (with a population of 45 million). Power
consumption, at around 124 kilowatt hours per capita per year is only a tenth of the
consumption in other developing countries – it corresponds to one 100-watt light bulb per
person for three hours a day.42 Only one in three Africans has access to electricity and the unelectrified depend primarily on kerosene or diesel. In this context, mining companies often
choose to generate their own power to run their operations. This causes a deadweight loss for
all parties:
- for the mines: although self–generation is often more reliable than the grid, it
increases the operating costs of the mine considerably;
- for the utility: self-generation means loss of large-scale and anchor customers; and
- for the country: self-generation means a less profitable mining sector and reduced
opportunities for linkages and sustainable development.
However, as this section explains, by capitalizing on the mining industry’s demand for
energy, it is possible to develop the national power generation facilities and electricity
transmission systems as well as increase access to electricity in remote areas where mining
companies tend to operate. Effective coordination could even result in the mines benefiting
from considerable cost-savings.
Key Definitions
Independent Power Producer (IPP): An IPP is an entity which is not a public utility, but
which owns facilities to generate electricity for sale to utilities and sometimes end users.
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA): Where capacity expansion is required, the investment
costs must be recoverable and revenue streams sufficiently definite into the future to enable
the owner to obtain financing on reasonable terms. Therefore, regulations often allow
providers and customers to enter into long-term contracts called PPAs, whereby the
customers (the utility or other users) commit to buying a minimum amount of capacity from
the owner over a longer period. In addition to indicating who would buy the power, “a strong
PPA details quantity and cost of power bought, dispatching of plants, fuel metering,
interconnection, insurance, force majeure, transfer, termination, change of legal provisions,
refinancing arrangements and dispute resolution mechanisms.”43
42

World Bank, “Fact Sheet – Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa,” available at:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21951811~page
PK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258644,00.html.
43
Gratwick, K. N., and A. Eberhard, “An Analysis of Independent Power Projects in Africa: Understanding
Development and Investment Outcomes,” Development Policy Review 26 (3), 2008.
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STEP 1: Assessing the current situation - What is at stake?
An important first step is to assess how mining companies are currently powering their
operations, and why they choose this particular arrangement. At the extremes, mining
companies are either completely self-sufficient, or able to source their power from national
infrastructure. An assessment of the country’s infrastructure situation and institutional gaps is
important in order to identify the most realistic scenarios for power-mine synergies and the
necessary steps to achieve them.
How do mining companies
currently generate electricity?

Self-Generation

Grid-Sourced Power

Why?
Abundant & Reliable Power:

Insufficient Supply:


Insufficient generation capacity to meet local 
demand let alone industrial demand
 Depending on the stage and type of 
operations, mines require a large amount of
power
Unreliable Supply:



Sufficient, reliable power source from
grid
Clear and credible institutional and
regulatory environment

Frequent power outages, seasonal power
variations
Power is crucial to mining operations, and
mines need to ensure reliability of power
Low cost of power:

High Cost of Grid Power:


Expensive fuel sources (e.g. diesel, HFO)  Cost of grid power is less than the cost
along with inefficient transmission results in
of self-generation
high costs to the end user.
 Power intensity of mining operations means
that profit margins are highly sensitive to
power costs
Low cost of connection:
Lack of Transmission Infrastructure:



Transmission network does not extend to 
mines
Transmission network is unable to carry high
voltage capacity for industrial use, requiring
relatively costly upgrade work as compared
with costs of self-generation.
36

Transmission infrastructure extends to
mining area or investment required to
connect to grid is profitable given
distance load and cost of generation
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The type of power sourcing arrangement will also be influenced by the type of mining
operation. Mining operations need more or less power depending on the commodity and even
more on the processing involved. Aluminium smelting will be a power intensive operation
whereas coal, iron-ore, platinum or gold mining will require small amounts of power. Power
costs can constitute between 10% and 25% of operational costs and the more the operation is
power-intensive, the more the mines will look to source inexpensive power.44

STEP 2: Identifying the operational synergies
Leveraging the mining industry’s power demand and its capital investments in power
infrastructure can facilitate the development of the national power system. From the situation
where mines have to self-generate due to a lack-, or unreliability of national generation and
transmission infrastructure, to one where mines can source power from a large-scale grid,
there exists the potential for mining companies to help develop the national power sector. The
figure below illustrates the wide range of possible potential power arrangements in the space
between mine self-generation and grid supply.
Spectrum of Power Sourcing Arrangements
2 Others

Presence

Generation
Drivers

Description

1

3

A1

A2

B

C

D

E

F

Mine
produces its
own power for
its own needs

Mine
provides
power to
community
through
mini-grids
or off-grid
solutions

Mine
produces its
own power
and sells
excess power
to the grid.

The mine is first
connected to
the grid and is
moving into
own-generation
when more
economical
(from G to A1)

Coordinated
investment by a
group of mines
/producers/users
in one large
power plant offsite connected to
the grid

Mine invests
with
government in
new and or
upgrading of
power assets
under different
arrangements

Mine buys
power from an
Independent
Power
Producer (IPP)
and serves as
an anchor
customer

Hydro (52.7%)
Oil (47.3%)

Hydro
(100%)

Hydro
(89.6%)
Coal(10.4%)

Hydro(99.8%)

Hydro(100%)

Hydro(82.2%)
Oil(14.3%)
Coal(3.5%)

Hydro(100%)

Hydro(81.1%)
Coal(12.2%),
Oil(6.7%)

Guinea and
Madagascar

Zimbabwe,
Mozambique
and
Cameroon

DRC and
Tanzania

Ghana

Niger and DRC

South Africa

Mozambique
Zambia

Mali and
Guinea (Hydro)
Sierra Leone,
Liberia (Oil)

G

Mine does
not produce
any power,
but buys
100% from
the grid

Source: World Bank45
This section explores a range of options between self-supply and grid supply.
a. Mines and Supply to Communities: Leveraging Mines for Rural Electrification
In the situation where there is no grid, or the grid is too remote from the mining area, mines
will have little choice but to self-generate. In this case, opportunities exist for mines to supply
power to surrounding areas. They could utilize off-grid renewable energy solutions – these

44

Sudeshna Ghosh Banerjee, Zayra Romo, Gary McMahon, Perrine Toledano, Peter Robinson, Ines Pérez
Arroyo, The Power of the Mine: A Transformative Opportunity for Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC:
World Bank (2015), available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21402 License: CC BY
3.0 IGO
45
Ibid.
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are becoming more popular among mining companies and more sustainable in terms of
operational costs, health, or environmental impacts as compared to diesel-based solutions.46
Another option is the development of a mini-grid that could also be based on renewable
energy. Such an arrangement could involve the mining companies partnering with donors,
NGOs and utilities. For example, the mining company could establish the mini-grid and the
utility could be in charge of operations, management, tariff collection and any additional
policy initiatives.
Example: Mini-grids in Tanzania and Guinea
One current illustration of a mini-grid initiative is a hybrid partnership between
Tanzania’s state-owned utility TANESCO and private stakeholders, supported by United
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). The project is called the 2012
Global Environment Facility (GEF4) project and its objective is to build mini-grids based
on micro hydropower to improve rural electrification in Tanzania.47
Another example is Rio Tinto and Infraco’s planned initiative to electrify the town of
Beyla, a town of 22,000 inhabitants expecting to grow given its proximity to Rio Tinto’s
Simandou mine The project will consist of installing a 1MW hydro power plant on the
Cessou river close to the village of Famoila, connecting the hydro plant to the town of
Beyla by a 20 km 20kV transmission line and completing and expanding the existing
distribution system in Beyla. The project is planned to be owned through an integrated
electric distribution utility “Beyla Energy” with a concession to generate and distribute
electricity within the prefecture of Beyla.48
The 2011 World Bank Africa Infrastructure report notes that governments have been
subsidizing the power sector in an effort to increase access to electricity to a wider segment
of the population. However, rather than increasing access, the benefits of these subsidies have
largely accrued to already connected rich and non-poor consumers, to the exclusion of the
largely non-grid connected low-income households in these countries. Given that much of the
population in these countries remains unconnected, the current power tariff subsidy system
has had little effect on expanding access to power. Governments could consider re-directing
public funds away from the usual, largely ineffective power tariff subsidies towards a more
focused subsidization of mini-grid development, which could lead to a more sustainable
strategy for collaboration with mining companies on rural electrification initiatives. Such
initiatives could also increase a mining company’s social license to operate in these areas, in
addition to assisting the government in meeting their rural electrification goals.
b. Mines and Excess Supply: Leveraging Mines for Increased Power Generation

46

For instance, there is a current effort by Semafo Inc, a gold mining company in Burkina Faso, to build a
20MW solar power plant under its subsidiary Semafo Energy, in partnership with the Burkinabe government. In
addition, in 2012, Exxaro Resources which is South Africa’s second largest coal miner, announced plans to
generate clean energy through the establishment of 5 renewable energy projects- 2 solar and 3 wind projects- in
a joint venture with an undisclosed third party (source: World Bank report - footnote 43)
47
Oxford Policy Management, 2012.
48
Infraco website, available at: http://www.infracoafrica.com/projects-guinea-beylapowerproject.asp.
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Where local conditions have led mining companies to generate their own power, there may
be situations in which mining companies can be incentivized to produce extra power capacity
to be sold back to the grid.
Example: Excess Power Supply by Mines in Mozambique
In Mozambique, the presence of non-exportable low quality thermal coal in the Moatize
deposits presents the opportunity for mining companies to build power plants both for
their own consumption and to sell power generated from thermal coal deposits for local
consumption. At present, four mining companies in the region have plans to construct
coal-fired power stations, which use their thermal coal deposits for the generation of
electricity. The power will be used in their own mining operations, and the excess will
be purchased and distributed by Electricidade de Moçambique (EDM), or by members of
the Southern African Power Pool. The most advanced of these plans is Vale’s Moatize
plant. The initial phase would involve a net plant capacity of 270MW, of which the mine
will consume 220MW, with the remainder to be sold to EDM, transmitted via the
Northern Grid. 49
Given the capital expenditure involved in building self-generation and the large potential
economies of scale in power investments, there may be a business case for mines to
coordinate a joint-investment.
c. Mines as an anchor for IPPs: Leveraging mines for increased generation
Given their large power needs, mines can also be used as anchor customers for IPP
generation investments. If the proposed generation investment promises cheaper power than
their current self-generation arrangements on a reliable basis, mining companies could be
incentivized to buy power from such projects under an offtake agreement, which provides
demand guarantees to increase the bankability of the power investment.
The structure of such an arrangement can take a number of forms. For example, the mine
could simply be the offtaker in an IPP project, or it could play a more active role in the IPP
investment as part of a joint venture.
Example: Mine as an Offtaker in Sierra Leone
In Sierra Leone, the Government has signed a Heads of Terms with Joule Africa, an
Independent Power Producer to develop Bumbuna II and the extension of Bumbuna I. They
have completed a pre-feasibility study which reveals that the project could generate power of
up to 372MW with a firm capacity of 112MW in the dry season. Interviews with London
Mining indicate that they have expressed interest in being an offtaker for some of this power,
under the right circumstances. 50
Example: Mines in Joint Venture Power Investment in Mauritania
Under a PPP agreement, the government, the national power utility (40%), the state-owned
mining company SNIM (26%) and Kinross Gold Corp. (34%) will develop a 350MW gas
power plant using the Banda offshore gas field in Mauritania. The arrangement under this
49

Nicolas Maennling , Alpa Shah and Sophie Thomashausen , “A Framework to Approach the Issue of Shared
Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure: Case Study: Mozambique,” Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment,
Columbia University, (2014).
50
Ibid.
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PPP is to set up a club of auto-producers with PPAs between the users and the shareholders:
the goal is to make a minimum return out of the investment, keep the costs down (12 cts/
kwh) and shareholder-users (such as Kinross) will still have to pay a user fee. As a result, the
electricity will be used for mining activities, domestic Mauritanian consumption and could
eventually be exported to neighbouring countries.51
Role of Mine in Mine-IPP Joint Venture

Power Developer

Financiers

Mining Company

PPA

Power Plant Project

PPA

Utility

The mining company facilitates the investment as:
-

-

Investment Initiator: The mining company would initiate/facilitate the investment in the
first instance, and can bring in strong developers, EPC contractors, lenders, investors and
advisers. The mining company’s commercial incentives to keep costs down would facilitate
the use of more competitive contractors.
Equity Investor: The mining company, in the planned investments mentioned above, could
contribute to meeting the equity requirements of the project.
Partial offtaker: The mining company will offtake a certain proportion of the power. This
will help with the bankability of the deal, as the mining company may be a credible off-taker,
and the company’s overall balance sheet and creditworthiness can help to underpin the deal.
The credibility of the mine as an off-taker should be carefully assessed. For instance, some
miners are junior companies with an undiversified portfolio. In this situation an IPP would be
inherently taking on some country/project specific risk, without the cushion of a
multinational balance sheet.
While it is preferable for a significant amount of power to be bought up by the government to
be supplied nationally to end users, the state-owned public utility is often a significantly less
credit-worthy partner and a guaranteed offtake from the utility would not ensure the
bankability of the project. As public utilities generally also subsidize power tariffs, so that the
full cost of financing the investment is unlikely to be reflected as a pass through in the tariff,
lenders will require additional comfort that they will be repaid.52 The presence of the utility
as an offtaker therefore necessitates a number of risk mitigation demands from financiers,
such as sovereign guarantees, escrow accounts, letters of credit and Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) insurance.
51
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World Bank, “The Power Of The Mine: A Transformative Opportunity For Sub-Saharan Africa,” op.cit.
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d. Mines source from Grid: Leveraging Mines for Increased Generation and
Transmission Infrastructure
Finally, we can consider the case where there is sufficient and inexpensive power available
through the national grid to supply the mines. In this case, it is important that the mine’s
power demand does not overburden the grid, or that mine supply is not prioritized over
residential demand.
However, with the prospect of inexpensive access to electricity, such as in the case of gasbased or hydro-based grids, mining companies will generally be willing to work with utilities
and sometimes competitors under various commercial arrangements to set up, or just upgrade
generation, transmission and distribution capacity to meet their demand.
It is important to find commercial frameworks that lead to cost savings for the mining
industry and allow the development of the country’s power infrastructure. Several
commercial frameworks are proposed below.
 Mines extend transmission infrastructure: Mining companies may have to pay some of
the investment costs of transmission lines and substations to connect to the grid and get
compensated.
A common arrangement between the mining company and the utility to improve the national
grid is for the mine to both build the infrastructure and provide a ‘loan’ to the utility that can
be repaid (with interest) in cash, or in kind through an off-set in the invoicing for power
purchased by the mine, as is the case in Burkina Faso with Semafo and in DRC with Katanga
Mining. The extension of transmission infrastructure to remote mining areas could then allow
the connection of small-scale users of power in the area to be connected to the national
supply, if the utility is able to install the necessary distribution, monitoring and enforcement
infrastructure.
Example: Transmission Investments in Burkina Faso and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC)
In October 2011 the Canadian-based mining company Semafo signed an agreement with the
Burkina Faso Government for the electricity supply to its Mana mine through a transmission
line estimated to cost US$19 million and reduce the mine power costs by US$40/oz. Sonabel,
the national power utility, would receive half of the money from Semafo and repay it over
eight years following commissioning. As a result of such an investment, energy costs for the
mine will drop from $0.31/kWh to $0.18/kWh.
In the DRC, to avoid costly self-generation, Katanga Mining Ltd took over the upgrade of the
national grid, and in March 2012 signed an agreement with SNEL, DRC’s public utility, for a
US$283.5 million loan. US$189 million will be reimbursed to the company by its affiliates at
the mines of Kansuki and Mutanda which will utilize a substantial part of the new electricity
produced, 10% of the power generated will be extra and sold back to SNEL and US$261.8
million of this investment will be reimbursed through utility bill credits with SNEL paying
interests on the loan.53
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To limit the number of loans incurred by the public utility, the potential for pooling resources
between mining companies around shared transmission infrastructure should always be
assessed. In some mining basin such as the coal basin in Tete province in Mozambique,
mines might be close enough to be able to share the same sub-station and the transmission
line.


-

Mines get priority access and either provide emergency generation capacity or pay a
premium rate: Energy crises are frequent in Africa and load shedding can generate
higher costs of production for the mines; therefore mines are always interested in priority
access to power supply. Since it can come at a cost for the rest of the country, there is an
absolute need for a mutually beneficial compensation scheme in place:
Mines could invest in extra emergency power infrastructure
Mines could make available the idle capacity of their emergency generators
Mines could negotiate a premium access rate

Example: Mines get priority access
In Ghana, the 2006-2007 energy crisis led a consortium of four mining companies (Newmont
Ghana Gold Ltd, AngloGold Ashanti, Goldfields Ghana, Golden Star Resources) to build an
80 megawatt dual fuel Thermal Plant at Tema. It was completed in 2007. As part of the
agreement, the ownership was transferred to the public utility, the Volta River Authority, and
the plant now serves as a back-up for the mines in case of another energy crisis. 54
In Zimbabwe, New Dawn Mining Corp.’s gold Turk-Angelus Mine is connected to the
national power grid through an 88KVA line and has three generators that are used as a
standby during any faults and that can supply 3MW of power. However, the Zimbabwe
Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) proposed the introduction of an uninterrupted electrical
supply arrangement with power charged at a premium rate, which is still lower than the cost
of operating the generators. Given that a suitable power line was available, the mine opted to
enter into an agreement with ZESA and moved its generators to another location.55
A last example comes from India: In 2006 the city of Pune in the state of Maharashtra,
experienced load shedding for two to three hours per day due to an estimated shortfall of
90MW of generating capacity of the Maharashtra State Power Generation Company. At the
same time, the top 30 industrial operators in Pune had unutilized captive capacity of 100MW.
In this context, the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), which comprises more than
9,000 companies, including mining companies and energy producers, proposed to the
Maharashatra Electricity Regulatory Commission that the operators utilize more of their idle
capacity and less of the grid power to meet the shortfall in exchange for compensation based
on the difference between the grid high-transmission tariff and its generating cost. The
compensation costs were to be borne by consumers in Pune, in return for no load-shedding.56
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Mining companies accept to pay higher tariffs if the investment is carried out by the
utility: Alternatively, by paying higher tariffs mines could increase the financial capacity
of the public utility, allow the utility to reach cost–recovery level and as a result allow the
utility itself to invest in generation and transmission. However the framework
underpinning the mine’s purchase of power must allow the flexibility to increase prices,
not only to account for inflation, but also to allow for the cost of wider infrastructure
investments to be reflected in the tariffs. Given the mining companies’ need for certainty,
and preference to lock in tariffs in long-term offtake agreements, the parameters for the
inclusion of such costs should be pre-agreed.

Example: Mines pay higher tariffs to fund power sector investment in Zambia
In Zambia, the copper industry growth has been constrained by available electricity supply.
At the same time, the electricity tariffs for the mines were the lowest in Africa and protected
by a stabilization agreement between 2008 and 2011. Copperbelt Energy Corporation Plc, the
independent power transmission group warned that industrial electricity tariffs would need to
increase by 20-30% per year to reflect actual costs and support new investments in power
generation. In 2011, with the tariff stabilization coming to an end and under approval of the
regulator, Zesco, the public utility, increased by 30% its bulk supply tariff to CEC which was
passed on to the mines.57

STEP 3: Verifying the necessary preconditions
3A: What are the necessary preconditions for each potential power-mine synergy?
Solution
Necessary Preconditions
Mines + Rural 
Electrification






Mines +
Supply

Excess 






57

Contractual requirement for mines to participate in rural
electrification initiatives
Coordination
between
mining
companies
and
donor/government/NGOs
Clear framework articulating responsibilities of each party
Capacity of each party to carry out their role
Presence of local government/utility in rural areas
Effective demand/willingness to pay for power in communities

Liberalized power market with clear legislative and regulatory
framework for private sector auto producers of power
Excess capacity built in at design phase of power plant project
Commercially viable offtake agreement between company and
utility
Credible state-owned utility, if acting as offtaker
Adequate transmission infrastructure to offtake and distribute
power
Demand for excess power (national or as part of regional power

World Bank, “The Power Of The Mine: A Transformative Opportunity For Sub-Saharan Africa” op cit.
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pool)

Mines as an anchor 
for IPPs







Mines source from 
grid





Liberalized power market with clear legislative and regulatory
framework for IPPs
Sufficient IPP power supply to meet mining demand as well as
excess supply for national grid
Sufficiently low cost and reliable power supply anticipated (vis-àvis current self-supply arrangement) to incentivise mining
company to act as offtaker
Power plant to be available to fit with mine’s planned timetable.
Other mine logistics (rail, port) not likely to delay mining project
and thus mining power demand
Investment in transmission infrastructure to supply power to mine
site
Utility to act as a credible partial offtaker of power from IPP

Sufficient and reliable national power supply to meet demand
Cost of power sufficiently low to dis-incentivize mining company
from self-supply, but sufficiently high to enable utility to achieve
cost recovery (covering capital and operating costs)
Transmission infrastructure in place to supply mine or extension
as a manageable investment
Management of mine’s power demand so as not to saturate the
national grid
Commercial frameworks in place to incentivize mines to
participate in or fund upgrade of transmission infrastructure and
development of national power generation capacity

3B: Are these preconditions in place?
a. Institutional, Legal and Regulatory Framework
Legal Framework
In order to realize these power-mine synergies, countries need to provide a sufficiently
predictable environment to attract investments by mining companies and IPPs in the power
sector. Until recently, the power sectors of many African countries have been monopolized
by a vertically integrated state-owned utility. The national electricity sectors also need to be
sufficiently liberalized to allow for the mining investments in power generation to
supplement the public utility’s investments or for the mining demand to attract IPPs.
In most African countries, the purchaser under the PPA is the public entity as the sole buyer.
If the system is structured as a wholesale market such as in Ghana, the PPA can be signed
between the mining company and a large-scale user, or between the mining company and an
IPP. A mining company may be incentivized to invest in extra-capacity where there is no
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single-buyer requirement – if the utility’s financial capacity is limited, or it is uncreditworthy, then the mining company can count on the presence of large customers for
excess generation. The challenge of this arrangement is that the excess generation would be
“captured” by large-scale end-users, thus leaving the public utility with low levels of
income.58 This arrangement should therefore be carefully assessed against projections of
power demand.
While liberalization efforts have begun or are in progress, in many countries legislation to
allow private participation in the power sector is still in development. When the legal
framework is ill-defined, many critical details such as the clear sharing of responsibilities
between public and private parties, performance obligations, dispute resolution mechanisms
and the ownership status of assets are left to negotiation and give little visibility to the
investor. This approach of “regulation by contract” will only work with a supportive legal
environment providing a clear and non-conflicting framework and which can ensure the
enforceability of contracts. Its success will also depend on both the government’s capacity to
negotiate a very complex contract and its commitment to transparency, given that contracts
are often bilaterally negotiated behind closed doors.
Regulator
In addition, such a liberalized market must be well-regulated. Strong regulatory oversight is
fundamental to attract IPPs to serve the mines or for the mines to act as IPPs by selling their
excess supply.
The regulator must manage a number of responsibilities:
- First, the regulator must manage risks and monitor contractual obligations with IPPs.
Regulators play an important role to enforce contracts, as well as to strengthen the
position of utilities that cannot provide sovereign guarantees—this could be through
mechanisms such as such as escrow accounts, profit repatriation, and guarantees against
nationalization.
- Second, regulatory oversight of tariffs charged by the mining company selling under
the PPA is necessary whatever the structure of the power market (vertically integrated
with private participation, wholesale market or retail markets) to ensure the viability of
the market for end-users.59 Of course to incentivize companies to generate extra
electricity, prices cannot be set too low. The regulatory institution must set cost-recovery
tariffs to enable the utility and private companies to maintain equipment and make further
capital investments. One method of price regulation is to have a light touch system
whereby the regulator does not fix the prices, but reviews the prices that have been fixed
by the parties, and issues comments on their reasonableness until they reach an adequate
level, as is the case in Nigeria for instance.60
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Toledano, “Leveraging mining demand to improve host country’s power infrastructure,” op.cit
The cost of bulk power supply is generally 50 to 70% of the distributor’s total supply costs. In Sub-Saharan
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Third, there is a need to ensure that mining companies have access to the
transmission network at non-discriminatory tariffs when they are authorized to sell power
to third parties. This is particularly needed in a context where the utility might be tempted
to increase its prices for competitors, and favour the electricity produced by its own
generators.61
It should be noted, that the most appropriate regulatory system depends on the institutional
context and the reforms being undertaken. It may be that an independent regulator is not
necessarily essential to the reform process. If the institutional capacity of a country is limited,
they could instead outsource regulatory functions to a third party or expert panel.62
Questions:
- Is a clear legal and regulatory framework in place in the power sector?
- Does the regulatory body have enough capacity to perform its function?
- Can the framework and institutions be strengthened through capacity building to
reach necessary levels?
- Are there other constraints aside from lack of capacity which might impede a
well-functioning institutional environment (e.g. political economy
considerations)?
b.

State-Owned Utility

Under the arrangements described under Step 2, the utility will be the main partner of the
mining company and associated IPPs, and therefore its financial health and
creditworthiness is essential to such efforts, and will determine the range of possible
arrangements which the mines and the private sector will be willing to engage in.
When acting as an offtaker of power, there should be enough credibility in the utility’s
ability to distribute this power to consumers with a sustained ability to pay for the power.
For many African countries, participation in a regional power pool can help matters,
reducing the financial risk to the utility and therefore such power investments because
excess supply will have an immediate outlet for sale into the regional energy market.
Questions:
-

c.

Is the utility sufficiently robust, credible and creditworthy to act as a partner to
the mines and associated IPPs?
If not, what are the main constraints which are undermining the health of the
utility?
Is an adequate reform process underway to ensure the financial health and
capacity of the utility in future?

Planning framework

Few countries have explicitly incorporated the power demands and investment plans of the
mining sector into their power master plans for the country. This has led to inadequate
national transmission grids. The grid may be insufficient with respect to its coverage, or its
capacity to transmit power. Many mines operate in remote areas not reached by the grid
61
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infrastructure which necessitates additional investment. Low and medium voltage systems are
inadequate to transmit the high voltage power needed or sold by mining companies. Even
where high voltage systems are in place, if these have not been well maintained, additional
restoration work may be necessary before additional industrial supply can be managed. In
Guinea, the lack of a strong, efficient transmission system explains why mines are selfgenerating. In the DRC, poor transmission links in the Katanga region led to collaboration
between the mines and the public utility to upgrade the links.63 Similarly, there are also
situations whereby the transmission network is not adapted to carry the load that mines could
sell back to the grid. For instance in Mozambique, Vale and Rio Tinto designed coal-fired
power plants with a capacity to sell 100MW to the local grid and 290MW to the South
African Power Pool but given the bottlenecks in infrastructure and the delay in construction
of the backbone grid, only 50MW from those plants would be evacuated.64
In many African countries, master plans are outdated, rigid, and do not reflect changes in
price and availability of fuel and equipment and the resulting least-cost arrangements, let
alone the mining synergies.
This situation might be improved under the following conditions:
- If the ministry of energy and mining are housed under the same ministry, as is the
case in Tanzania, Mauritania and Cameroon.
- If the private sector is brought into partnership with the government to develop
large hydropower and other generation projects through a specialised entity, such
as the Office for the Promotion of Private Power Investment (OPPI) in Zambia.
- If the mines and other big users of power are involved in planning how best to
exploit the country’s hydropower resources, facilitated by the recently formulated
Electricity Law, such as in Cameroon. The new legal framework requires private
developers to compete for hydro sites, except where the site is to be allocated to a
mine for the development of power for its own needs. In this case the law
requires the generation of surplus electricity which is to be sold to the grid at cost
recovery tariffs, all to be determined by the regulator as explained in the box
below.
In a Policy Letter signed by the Prime Minister, dated February 17, 2012, the
Government of Cameroon committed itself to develop all secondary legislation
under the 2011 Electricity Law in consultation with stakeholders. In particular
this secondary legislation will stipulate the principles to be used for determining
the quantity of electricity allocated to the public grid and it will include i)
domestic supply and demand projections, ii) preference for supply to domestic
consumers ahead of industrial consumers or export of electricity, iii) existing
arrangements between auto‐producers and the public grid concessionaire, iv) the
physical characteristics of the site and v) electricity demand of the auto‐
producer.65
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Such policy planning and sector coordination is especially required when:
-

-

the government’s intention is to attract IPPs using mining demand as an anchor
for such investments, but with the objective of off-taking part of the IPP’s power
to also serve other user demand; and
the government’s intention is to tap into the high voltage bulk power lines that
mines might build to access the grid: in this case, significant additional
infrastructure would be necessary (substations, transformers) in order for the
power supply to step down to a voltage level which can be used by small-scale
industrial or agricultural users. In addition, for such smaller-scale users to access
the grid supply, an active utility is required to install distribution infrastructure,
monitor usage, and collect payments in these areas.

Given the exposure to risks and the capital expenditure involved in both of these
undertakings, anticipation of and planning for potential demand is necessary.
Planning for power and mining synergies, however, is sometimes relegated to second
place when the “pit-to-port” transport logistics of mining operations is a constraint. For
example, in Guinea and Mozambique, the expansion of iron ore mining and coking coal
exports is constrained much more by transport constraints than by electricity concerns.
Questions:
- Is the Power Master Plan integrating the growth of the mining demand for
energy?
- Does the government have in place coordination platforms with the mining
sector?
- Has the government anticipated the growth in energy demand and the
possibility to meet this demand by leveraging generation and transmission
infrastructure put in place to serve the needs of the mine?
- Are infrastructure constraints impeding progress in the realization of minepower synergies? Can these constraints be overcome?
- For transmission infrastructure, is there a role for donors to play in funding
transmission lines/reinforcement projects? (e.g. World Bank’s Inga to
Kasumbalesa transmission line reinforcement project in DRC66)
- Does the necessary commercial framework exist for the mining
companies/private sector to fund the transmission and recoup the
investment?
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STEP 4: Negotiating points
Necessary Preconditions


Mines +Rural
Electrification






Negotiating Points

Contractual requirement for mines to participate in
rural electrification initiatives.
Coordination between mining companies and
donor/government/NGOs.
Clear framework articulating responsibilities of each
party.
Capacity of each party to carry out their role.
Presence of local government/utility in rural areas.
Effective demand/willingness to pay for power in
communities.











Mines
+ 
Excess Supply 

67

Liberalized power market with clear legislative and
regulatory framework for private sector power
producers
Excess capacity built in at design phase of power plant
project.
Commercially viable offtake agreement between
company and utility
Credible state-owned utility, if acting as offtaker,
Adequate transmission infrastructure to offtake and
distribute power

Toledano, “ Leveraging mining demand to improve host country’s power infrastructure,” op cit..
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Is this part of a mining company’s CSR initiatives or is it to be a
contractual obligation (developing model concession agreements
mandating the provision of electricity within a certain radius
would increase certainty for investors, put all mining companies
on an equal footing in their corporate social responsibility
programs, and increase the accountability of government as the
contract enforcement authority67)
Which parties will be involved (government, utility, donors,
NGOs)?
What are the responsibilities of each party?
How will the initiative be sustained after the mine leaves?
Is there a need to give a financial incentive to ensure a more
sustainable initiative from the mine? If so, the subsidies currently
used for social tariffs might be reoriented to support a mini-grid.
How much excess power should be mandated e.g. a certain %
excess power above the mines planned plant size?
Is there scope for coordination, resource pooling and joint
strategy among the different mining companies operating in the
region?
What are the terms of the Power Purchase Agreement (Power
Price, Length of Agreement)? Power purchase agreement must
be commercially viable for mining company as well as
affordable to utility.
Is the public utility a viable partner? Mining company may
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Demand for excess power (national or as part of
regional power pool)








Mines as an
anchor
for 
IPPs



Liberalized power market with clear legislative and
regulatory framework for IPPs.
Sufficient IPP power supply to meet mining demand as
well as excess supply for national grid.
Sufficiently low cost and reliable power supply
anticipated (vis-à-vis current self-supply arrangement)
to incentivise mining company to act as offtaker.
Power plant to be available to fit with mine’s planned
timetable. Other mine logistics (rail, port) not likely to
delay mining project and thus mining power demand.
Investment in transmission infrastructure to supply
power to mine site.
Utility to act as a credible partial offtaker of power
from IPP.
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demand additional security if utility is not sufficiently
creditworthy (e.g. sovereign guarantee, MIGA insurance, escrow
accounts, letters of credit)
At what point does the offtake occur? Who is responsible for
transmission and distribution of power? Is there sufficient
demand for this excess power in the national/regional market?
If at negotiation/feasibility study stage, conditions are not yet in
place to distribute power, can the power plant be designed and
constructed so that it can be expanded on a commercially
feasible basis?
What will become of the infrastructure when the mine ceases
operations?
What structure will this investment take – will the mine simply
act as an offtaker, or participate actively as a member of a joint
venture in the IPP investment?
Is the timeframe for commissioning the power plant in line with
the mining operations? What provisions will be made for delays
in power availability? Have risk assessments and default
possibilities been sufficiently taken into account? Are
completion guarantees and operating guarantees necessary?
How much of the generated power will the mine offtake?
(Balance between mining needs and supply to national grid)
What are the terms of the Power Purchase Agreement (Power
Price, Length of Agreement)? Do the terms vary between mine
and utility?
How will the PPA be structured i.e. single party PPA with
complete offtake and redistribution by utility vs. multiparty PPA
from IPP to individual end users?
Is the public utility a viable partner? IPP may demand additional
security if utility is not sufficiently creditworthy (e.g. sovereign
guarantee, MIGA insurance, escrow accounts, letters of credit)
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Mines source 
from Grid


Sufficient and reliable national power supply to meet

demand.
Cost of power sufficiently low to disincentivize mining
company from self-supply, but sufficiently high to
enable utility to achieve cost recovery (covering capital 
and operating costs)
Transmission infrastructure in place to supply mine or

extension as a manageable investment.
Management of mine’s power demand so as not to
saturate the national grid.
Commercial frameworks in place to incentivize mines
to participate in or fund upgrade of transmission
infrastructure and development of national power
generation capacity.
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Is the mining company a viable partner? If not a multi-national
company and significant country/project risk IPP may demand
additional security if utility is not sufficiently creditworthy (e.g.
escrow accounts, letters of credit)
 Who will be responsible for transmission and distribution of
power, both to the mines and to the utility?
 What provisions can be made for when the mine ceases
operations?
Who will be responsible for transmission and distribution of power
to the mines?
If transmission infrastructure is financed by the private sector, will
ownership be transferred to the utility? How will investment be
recovered?
How can the transmission design ensure that minimal additional
investment in distribution infrastructure can allow smaller users to
tap into grid supply?
How will mines contribute to ensuring that their power demand does
not overburden the grid?
o In exchange for priority access in the event of load shedding,
what can mines provide in terms of additional generation
capacity to expand the grid supply? E.g. investment in extra
emergency power infrastructure, making available the idle
capacity of their emergency generators.
o Can a margin be charged on the power tariff for the mines to
facilitate the utility’s investment in additional power
generation and transmission infrastructure?
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Framework 3
Shared Use in the context of Water
Introduction
To meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of halving the proportion of people
without sustainable access to safe drinking water68 and basic sanitation by 2015, the African
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic estimates that the 48 states in Sub-Saharan Africa would
collectively needed to have been spending approximately US$16.5 billion on water infrastructure
per year between 2006 and 2015. This far exceeds the current estimated annual spend of US$3.6
billion.69 While operational inefficiencies, poorly targeted subsidies and underpricing of water
supply services account for part of the reason that the MDGs will not be met, the overall
financing gap for the water sector is still huge at an estimated US$7.8 billion a year.
At the same time, water is also of critical importance in mining. Large volumes of water are
required at each phase of the mining process to suppress dust, process and mine ore, cool and
wash mining equipment, manage waste tailings, and for consumption by mining communities.
Without water, a mine cannot operate. Yet, mining companies increasingly find themselves
operating in water stressed environments where there is a physical shortage of fresh water, or
water availability for the mines is limited by regulation, and considerable investment in water
infrastructure is required to ensure a reliable water supply for mining operations. Estimates
suggest that the mining sector’s total annual expenditure70 on water-related infrastructure
globally in 2011 was $7.7 billion.71 The most important sectors responsible for this growth in
expenditure are water supply, reuse, metals recovery and effluent treatment.
In addition, mines are frequently located in places where access to safe and reliable water
services is inadequate to meet local community requirements. The perception that mines may be
draining available water resources, or are polluting or altering the course of existing water
68

Access to safe drinking water is “measured by the number of people who have a reasonable means of getting an
adequate amount of clean water, expressed as a percentage of the total population. It reflects the health of a country's
people and the country's ability to collect, clean, and distribute water. In urban areas "reasonable" access means
there is a public fountain or water spigot located within 200 meters of the household. In rural areas, it implies that
members of the household do not have to spend excessive time each day fetching water. Water is safe or unsafe
depending on the amount of bacteria in it. An adequate amount of water is enough to satisfy metabolic, hygienic,
and domestic requirements, usually about 20 liters (about 4 gallons) per person per day.” Source: World Bank’s
Development Education Program, available at:
http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/modules/environm/water/texta.html.
69
“Chapter 16: Water Supply: Hitting the Target?” in Vivien Foster and Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia eds., Africa’s
Infrastructure: A time for Transformation, World Bank, 2010.
70
Whether the expenditure is public, private, by mining companies, or by third parties.
71
Sarah Thomas, “Water and mining: a love/hate relationship?,” 27(3) Water World (2012), available at:
http://www.waterworld.com/articles/wwi/print/volume-27/issue-3/regional-spotlight/latin-america/water-andmining-a-love-hate.html; and “Mining a rich seam for water companies,” 12(7) Global Water Intelligence (2011),
available at: http://www.globalwaterintel.com/archive/12/7/general/mining-rich-seam-water-companies.html.
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sources can result in considerable social tensions with surrounding communities and result in
operational disruptions. Mining companies are also coming under pressure to minimize the
environmental impact of their water usage and effluent discharge, where not properly doing so
can incur substantial reputational, regulatory, and operational costs.
In this context, governments should ensure that mining-related investments in water
infrastructure are aligned with the goals and interests of the communities in which they operate
as well as to national development goals. On the one hand, this relates to water quality.
Governments need to enact, monitor and enforce tight environmental regulations to require
mining companies to minimize their ecological footprint. On the other hand, as [fresh] water
sources become scarcer, whether as a result of climate change, low annual rainfall, water
pollution, or increasing demands on available water sources, governments need to enact policies
that oblige mining companies to minimize fresh water usage, maximize water re-use and
recycling, and look to other water sources – such as seawater or sewage waste water, to meet
their remaining water supply needs.
To protect against such regulatory limitations on water allocations requires mines to invest in
more efficient water management systems and consider the scope for shared use schemes. This
framework addresses the scope for synergies between the water infrastructure needs of mines
and the water supply needs of surrounding communities.
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Key Definitions
Acid Mine Drainage (AMD): a sulphuric acid that is formed when sulphur-bearing materials,
such as pyrites in ground, come into contact with air and water. This often occurs in open pit
mining when, for example, coal seams are excavated as well as from runoff or seepage from
overburden or coal/ ore stockpiles. The presence of AMD increases the acidity (lowers the pH)
of water and also has the ability to liberate heavy metals such as cadmium, antimony, arsenic,
iron and dissolved solids such as calcium and sulphates, from the rocks it comes into contact
with.72
Beneficiation: the mechanical and chemical processes used to extract the desired product from
ore (i.e. to improve its grade), the waste product of which is tailings.
Dewatering: The process of draining the water that collects in the open pits during the mining
process. Water collects in the open pits when ore or coal is excavated below the water table, or
from rainfall.
Open pit (or strip) mining: a type of surface mining to extract ore or coal that lies up to 200m
below the surface.73 In the case of coal, once the coal seam is exposed, it is drilled, fractured and
systematically mined in strips. 74
Overburden: the soil and rock which are excavated from open pits to reach a coal seam or mine
ore.
Surface run-off: runoff of waste water from the overburden due to rain or flooding
Tailings: the waste stream of ground rock and process effluents (including unrecoverable and
uneconomic metals, minerals, chemicals, organics and process water) that are generated in a
mine processing plant during beneficiation. Tailings are usually discharged, normally as slurry,
to a final storage area commonly known as a Tailings Management Facility (TMF) or Tailings
Storage Facility (TSF).75
Water scarcity: Water scarcity relates to the availability of clean water. Water scarcity can
occur even in areas where there is plenty of rainfall. Flooding, which is normally associated with
excessive water availability, can also result in water scarcity to the extent it contaminates clean
water sources or disrupts the treatment of water when waste water treatment facilities are overrun
with water. How water is conserved, used and distributed in communities, as well as the quality
of the water available, can determine if there is enough to meet the demands of households,
farms, industry and the environment.

72

“Water Management: Waste not, want not,” Mining Magazine, July/ August 2010.
73 I. Satyanarayana, “Basics of Open-pit mining”, March 13, 2012, available at www.slideshare.net/isnindian.
74 World Coal Association website, “Coal,” available at: http://www.worldcoal.org/coal/coal-mining/.
75
Tailings.info website, “What are Tailings – Their nature and production,” available at:
http://www.tailings.info/basics/tailings.htm.
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STEP 1: Assessing the current situation: what is at stake?
An important first step is to assess the availability of water resources and existing water
infrastructure to supply water to - and treat water for the current and projected water users. In
terms of water resources, information is required as to the available water sources and their
renewability, i.e. the annual projected rainfall and/or recharge capacity of any underground
aquifers, the current and projected demands on those water resources and the impact of the
mining operations on those water resources in relation to their stated water requirements. In
terms of a mining operation’s fresh water dependency, at the extremes, mining companies either
source all their water from fresh water sources (underground or surface water), or from other
sources (recycled water, seawater, waste water etc.) when no fresh water is available, or no water
license has been awarded for fresh water usage.

Questions to ask in relation to existing water resources and water infrastructure:
-

What are the available water resources? What is their annual renewability? (annual projected rainfall
and/ or recharge capacity of aquifers )
Who are the current and projected water users (including the surrounding community and the mine)?
How much water does the mining operation require and how is the mining company planning to
obtain water for its operations?
What is the existing water infrastructure?

In relation to the water infrastructure, an assessment of the existing water supply and treatment
situation needs to be made and whether, to the extent such water infrastructure exists, it can or
should support a mining operation’s water requirements. At the extremes in relation to water
supply infrastructure, mining operations are either completely self-sufficient in terms of having
their own self-constructed or rehabilitated water infrastructure from which to source [and treat]76
water, or are able to obtain water and/or have waste water treated by a local authority.

76

Some mining companies interviewed did not treat water and imported bottled water for drinking purposes.
Regulation is required to ensure mines are treating all mine waste water, including sewage and other domestic waste
water from the on-site mining community.
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Where do mining companies
obtain water from and how?

From water sources using own infrastructure

From local water authority

Why?

No, or limited existing water distribution Good existing water infrastructure:
infrastructure at location of mine area, or  Sufficient, reliable water supply from
unreliable supply:
existing water distribution network.
 Insufficient water infrastructure to meet  Reliable [and creditworthy] water
local water supply demand, let alone
authority to supply water to the mine site
industrial use.
and/ or treat residential waste water from
 Unreliable supply due to poor
mining community.
management of water infrastructure, or
power outages (where electricity required
to power water pumps).77
Abundant water sources from nearby Low cost of water:
source without cost (or notional charge)
 Cost of sourcing water from and/or
having waste water treated by public
authority is lower than building own
infrastructure to source water.
 Transparent water tariff where pass
through costs are known or fixed.
Lack of distribution infrastructure:
Low cost of connection to existing
 Distribution network does not extend to distribution network:
mines and the cost of extension is  Distribution infrastructure extends to
mining area, or investment required to
equivalent to, or greater than the cost of
connect to water supply which, on a costself-sourcing water.
benefit analysis, is positive taking into
account the distance to the water
distribution network and cost of sourcing
own water.
No operational or credible water authority Water authority as credible partner for
in the area.
offtake agreement.
77

Reliable water supply is crucial for mining operations – particularly for mining water-intensive commodities such
as copper or gold.
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Where mining companies source their own water for mining operations, the water source will
depend on the water demand of the mine, the availability of water resources, government
regulation, and corporate policies:
a. Water demand – Some minerals tend to be more water intensive than others, as
is illustrated by the table on the next page from a 2011 Frost & Sullivan study.
However, with the increasing reliance on low-grade ores, harder-to-reach mineral
deposits and the mining of tailings, mining is generally becoming more intensive in
its overall water requirements.78 This is because water use is a function of the volume
of ore extracted rather than the weight of the finished product sold. 79With a low grade
product, to generate the same amount of finished product it is necessary to invest in
more water infrastructure.80
b. Availability of fresh water resources – where water resources are abundant, and/or
there is little or no regulation requiring otherwise, mining companies may obtain all,
or a large part of their water from fresh water sources. By contrast, when water
sources are scarce, or limited fresh water is available to the mining company, it will
be required to limit its use of water and/ or to seek alternative water sources.81
c. Law – Legislation plays an important role in regulating where companies source their
water and how efficiently water is managed. Strict environmental regulations and a
water licensing regime that only allocates limited water rights to fresh water sources
to a mining company may require it to seek alternative sources, to re-use/ recycle
water, and to implement more efficient water management systems that require less
water in the mining process.
d. Corporate policy – Large-scale mining heavy weights such as Vale, Anglo
American, ArcelorMittal, and Rio Tinto have internal policies on water management
and usage that are implemented to varying degrees across their global operations.

Water intensity of key mineral and Metals (Frost and Sullivan – 2011)

78

“Mining a rich seam for water companies,” Global Water Intelligence, Vol. 12, Issue 7 (July 2011), available at:
http://www.globalwaterintel.com/archive/12/7/general/mining-rich-seam-watercompanies.html#sthash.xCRPFkVx.dpuf.
79
“Mining a rich seam for water companies”, Global Water Intelligence, op cit.
80
“Mining a rich seam for water companies”, Global Water Intelligence, op cit.
81
Even in water abundant countries like Liberia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone, lack of adequate water storage,
treatment, and supply infrastructure means that water sources are unevenly distributed and not always available
throughout the country, particularly during the dry season. Potable drinking water is also limited.

57

Draft for public consultation: January 2014
A Framework to Approach Shared Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure –Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment

STEP 2: Identifying the operational synergies
Across the spectrum from mines operating in an enclave and sourcing their own [fresh] water to
mines fully integrated with the water infrastructure constructed and managed by a water
authority, there is the potential to leverage the mining industry’s capital investments in water
infrastructure for the development of water infrastructure at a local level to meet the drinking
water needs of communities.
This section explores three scenarios for leveraging mining-related investments in water
infrastructure for development: First, where a mining company expands the capacity of its
infrastructure – either at the design phase, or during an expansion of its operations, to supply
treated water to surrounding communities. Second, where a mining company acts as an anchor
for investments in off-site water infrastructure which will then supply and/or treat both the water
requirements of the mining company(ies) and other users. Third, where a mining company
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sources its own water, but agrees to collaborate with other stakeholders to rehabilitate, extend, or
construct required water infrastructure for surrounding communities.
a. Mines and excess supply of water: leveraging mines for increased drinking water
Alternative sources of water for mining operations can come from (1) dewatering, (2)
desalination and (3) mine, or residential waste water.
Mines supply excess treated water from dewatering
As mining companies excavate deeper below ground water levels to extract ore and mineral
deposits, water ingress poses an increasing challenge. For active mines, water that collects in
the mine pits – whether it be from rainfall, mining activities, or ground water– needs to be
drained (“dewatered”) and carefully stored to continue mining activities and ensure that mine
waste in this water does not contaminate ground and surface waters. There is the opportunity
to mitigate the costs of dewatering and treat dewatered water through collaboration with
other mining companies, local authorities, or other water offtakers, at the same time
supplying water to local communities.
Example: eMalahleni Water Reclamation Plant in South Africa
Anglo American’s Thermal Coal workings, located in the Witbank coalfields, located
around the city of eMalahleni, contain approximately 140,000 megaliters of excess ground
water that need to be drained from the excavation pits to continue mining. This water poses
serious challenges to the active mines, but more so in closed mines, where without adequate
management, the mine water can contaminate groundwater sources. At the same time, the
region surrounding eMalahleni is a highly water stressed area with sporadic rainfall and flash
flooding when it does rain. eMalhahleni local municipality (ELM) has also been struggling to
meet the water needs of the local population.
After a decade of research and development, Anglo American partnered with BHP Billiton
pursuant to a joint investigation agreement to commission the eMalahleni Water Reclamation
Plant (EWRP) in 2007. The plant is owned and operated by Anglo American, treating water
from three Anglo American Thermal Coal operations, while BJP Billiton procured a “rightof-use” of the EWRP to treat water from its South Witbank Colliery on the basis of shared
operating costs. In addition, Anglo American negotiated with the ELM to deliver treated
water from the plant into the local municipality’s drinking water system.
Using the latest in water purification technology, it is currently desalinating record
production volumes of 23 megaliters of water to potable quality per day, 18 megaliters of
which is pumped directly into the ELM’s reservoirs, meeting some 20% of its daily water
requirements.
Additional water is piped to Greenside, Kleinkopje and Landau collieries as well as various
nearby Anglo Coal service departments for domestic use and for mining activities, such as

59

Draft for public consultation: January 2014
A Framework to Approach Shared Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure –Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment

dust suppression. These operations are now self-sufficient in terms of their water
requirements, which eases the serious supply problems of the local municipality.82
Given the capital costs associated with dealing with water ingress, there may be a business
case for mining companies to collaborate in treating and re-using the water or supplying it to
surrounding communities.
Mines supply excess desalinated water
Where mining companies are operating in highly water scarce areas, seawater may be the
only viable option – even if it needs to be piped hundreds of kilometers to the mine site. This
requires a huge capital investment from mining companies that includes not only a seawater
desalination project, but also a high pressure conveyance pipeline to supply the seawater to
the site and an energy transmission project to power the desalination plant, although solarpowered desalination technology is starting to be rolled out.
The direct cost for desalinated seawater supply has been estimated to vary between US$1 to
US$4 per cubic meter of water, depending on the altitude and distance of the mining
operations from the coast.83 This can represent between 3% and 20% of the total direct
operational costs of a mining operation, providing a financial incentive to mines both to
minimize their water requirements and to investigate joint collaborations to offset some
costs.
A scenario where a mining company is required to construct a desalination plant also
presents the opportunity for it to provide potable, desalinated water to surrounding
communities in partnership with a local water authority. The incremental marginal cost of
expanding the capacity of a desalination plant to provide additional water to communities
may be relatively small to the mining company compared with the capital investment of
financing the construction of a desalination plant. In some cases, such as with the mining
company Areva’s former operations in Namibia, the Namibian government also required
Areva to provide water.
Example: Areva’s operations in Namibia
After obtaining a mining license for the Trekkopje uranium mine in northwestern Namibia,
Areva was required to construct a seawater supply and desalination plant to provide the mine
with water given strict restrictions on water extraction from coastal aquifers. During this
process, it collaborated with NamWater, the Namibian water authority, to distribute excess
water from the desalination plant to the water short Erongo region.84

82

WCA Case Study, “eMalahleni Water Reclamation Plant: South Africa,” World Coal Association, 2008, available
at http://www.worldcoal.org/resources/case-studies/emalahleni-water-reclamation-plant/.
83
Raymond Philippe and Hubert Fleming, “Unearthing Efficient Mining Water Solutions,” Water World, op cit.
84
International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM), “Water management in mining: a selection of case studies”
(2012), available at: http://www.icmm.com/www.icmm.com/water-case-studies.
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Mines supply excess treated waste water
Mining companies may be able to meet water needs by recycling their own waste water for
re-use, or, more innovatively, the organic waste/ sewerage water of neighboring communities
after some primary treatment, and then providing excess treated potable water back to
communities. An example of this is the Cerro Verde copper and molybdenum mining
operations of Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold in Arequipa, Peru, where a large
wastewater treatment facility is under construction to meet the mining operation’s increased
water needs when it expands its operations, while at the same time supplying excess water to
a surrounding community.85
Example: Waste water treatment plant for Arequipa – Cerro Verde expansion86
Copper mining requires water to concentrate copper and to process it into cathode copper.
The Cerro Verde expansion project, which will triple the mining operations’ extraction and
processing of sulfide ore, will require an approximate 85% increase in its water requirements.
In 2011, after conducting feasibility studies to evaluate the possibility of constructing a
wastewater treatment plant to meet its additional water needs following the expansion of its
operations, Cerro Verde entered into discussions with the Regional Government of Arequipa,
the national government, SEDAPAR (the local utility) and other local institutions to allow
Cerro Verde to finance the engineering and construction of this treatment plant as part of its
mine expansion plans. The plant will be operated by SEDAPAR and is expected to treat
wastewater from the city of Arequipa, improve the water quality of the Rio Chili and provide
a clean supply of water for the agricultural sector in the region. Construction began in 2013.

b. Mines as an anchor for investment in water supply, storage and treatment
infrastructure: leveraging mines for increased water supply
Local governments or water authorities can use mining companies as anchor customers to attract
investment for water infrastructure investments given the generally large water requirements of
mining operations. From a government perspective, a long offtake agreement with a credible and
credit-worthy mining company may help to secure financing where (1) the local government is
institutionally weak, (2) subsidized water tariffs mean that cost recovery is negative, and (3) it is
difficult to obtain reliable data to project consumer demand:
i. Weak institutional capacity of local government/ water authority

85

International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM), “Water management in mining: a selection of case studies”
(2012), available at: http://www.icmm.com/www.icmm.com/water-case-studies. See also: “Cerro Verde Facts:
Cerro Verde Expansion,” Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold (July 2011), available at: www.fcx.com; and Greta
Bourke, “Freeport expects to start construction of US$4bn Cerro Verde expansion in 2013”, BNAmericas, July 19,
2012.
86
Ibid.
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Where the local government entity/ water authority is weak, financiers may be
reluctant to provide the necessary financing without some comfort that it is
sufficiently capable of managing the water supply or treatment services in a manner
that maximizes cost-recovery and minimizes operational inefficiencies and losses.
ii. Water tariff
Financiers require some certainty that the net revenues of the water authority will be
sufficient over the tenor of the loan to repay them. This may not be the case where
the water tariff is below the cost recovery level due to water subsidies. In such a
scenario, financiers may be unwilling to provide financing, or will require some form
of guarantee or credit support to become comfortable with the country risk they are
taking in relation to the water subsidy. Such guarantees can be expensive for
governments to source, particularly when they have a low country rating.
iii. Consumer demand
Financiers require reliable data on water consumption in relation to the water
infrastructure they will be financing.87 Such data may be a challenge to obtain in a
developing country context, particularly where census figures are not regularly
updated, there is a high economic and social mobility, and many future users of water
infrastructure may presently be obtaining their water directly from boreholes and
other underground or surface water sources.
Securing a mining company as an offtaker with predictable annual water requirements could
mitigate each of these challenges by providing an anchor demand for water supply projections
and improving cost recovery where the subsidies charged to (poorer) residential consumers are
offset by the higher, unsubsidized water tariffs charged to the mining company.
In turn, mining companies will consider entering into offtake agreements with a water authority
in anticipation of an upgrade/ expansion/ extension of existing water infrastructure if the
proposed water infrastructure: (1) reduces the cost of constructing water infrastructure in an
enclave model or sourcing water elsewhere, (2) a reliable water supply can be guaranteed, and
(3) they have certainty of the tariff they will be charged:
1. Reduces costs
There may be cost savings to be had if mining companies collaborate with a local
authority and/ or other stakeholders to upgrade/ expand/ extend existing water
infrastructure.
2. Reliability of supply - step-in rights
87

This includes estimates on the size of the population, the coverage area and the average water consumption of the
population, which is obtained from data on household water consumption based on population census information
relating to the number of members in a household, the size of the house and the number of toilets and showers etc.
Source: Interview with Bigen, South Africa, September 30, 2013.
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Step-in rights may address mining companies’ concerns about the water authority’s
ability to provide a continuous and reliable water supply. These rights provide a
mechanism by which the mining company is allowed to step into the shoes of the
water authority and take over the water supply where certain pre-agreed supply
parameters are not met. These step-in rights would need to be negotiated with both
the local government/ water authority as well as any financiers, given that the latter
also generally require step-in rights where they are providing financing on a projectfinance basis.
3. Certainty of water tariff
Mining companies strongly resist attempts to include a variable pass through charge
for unrestricted capital investments in water infrastructure over and above the
existing water infrastructure. A transparent pass through variable, capped as a
percentage or otherwise indexed, can alleviate these concerns and therefore allow
local authorities to leverage their off-take agreements with mining companies to
cross-subsidize the capital and operational charges of supply water to low-income
households up to a certain level. Donor-funding could also be sought for any scheme
to extend and upgrade the water infrastructure and distribution network.
c. Mines and supply to communities: leveraging mines for provision of potable water
to rural communities
- Constructing piped water supply, treatment and storage infrastructure for communities
where such water infrastructure is not required for the mining company’s own operations
In the situation where mines are sourcing their own water and/ or have no need for an on-site
water treatment facility,88 but surrounding communities have limited access to safe drinking
water, opportunities exist for rehabilitating, expanding, or replicating the self-supply options to
surrounding peri-urban or rural locations. Such water infrastructure investment could also be
mandated in the mining concession itself, or be negotiated as part of a CSR program.
Example: Rio Tinto upgrading and rehabilitating water supply systems in Fort Dauphin,
Madagascar
Fort Dauphin in Madagascar has a population of around 50,000 people, but its water
infrastructure is in disrepair and around 90% of the population does not have ready access to
potable water. The water requirements for Rio Tinto-owned QMM Madagascar Minerals SA
(QMM)’s mineral sands project, and the expected growth of the town due to the project
development cannot be supported by the existing infrastructure.
While QMM is able to contribute funds and engineering expertise to the upgrade and
improvement of Fort Dauphin’s water infrastructure, it is not a sustainable solution for the region
88

Some mining companies provide bottled water to mining communities rather than treating water to meet drinking
water standards. Such mines generally have low water requirements for their processes (See Section D).
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for it to perform the role of a water service provider to the town. QMM therefore initiated a
consultative process resulting in a collaborative partnership with the World Bank and JIRAMA,
the local service provider, to upgrade and extend the town supply and reticulation.
Under the agreement the town supply line is being replaced, with a new treatment plant being
constructed by QMM. The World Bank will assist with both financing and engineering to
upgrade the town’s reticulation and distribution network, and operation by JIRAMA has been
formally agreed. QMM will also assist with the training and management of the treatment
facilities.89

- Providing self-contained, small-scale water supply and treatment solutions as part of a CSR
program
Where water supply infrastructure is non-existent or defunct, mining companies may be more
inclined to provide low cost water technology solutions where they can fund the initial
capital cost of the water supply or treatment system, but do not need to operate or maintain,
or necessarily commit to financing the operation and maintenance of the system.


Investment in low-cost water supply technologies such as boreholes with hand
pumps and wells
Mining companies operating in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique and other subSaharan African countries regularly supply low cost water supply technologies such
as boreholes with hand pumps and wells to local communities, in collaboration with
such communities, as part of their CSR programs.
Three concerns have been identified with such programs, which need to be addressed:







89

Water quality – monitoring of water required to ensure it is not contaminated
with mine waste or, in the case of wells, high in bacteria and other pathogens that
are harmful for human consumption.
Maintenance of technology – community capacity must be built to be able to
own and maintain the technology. Experience from London Mining in Sierra
Leone shows that such technologies can fall into disrepair if the community buyin and capacity is not there to maintain the technology.
Seasonal variability of water sources – water may not be available from such
water points throughout the year. Mining companies need to ensure that the
availability of ground sources has been considered, preferably in collaboration
with the relevant water authority or NGOs providing water services in the area,
before boreholes and wells are constructed.

Self-sufficient water treatment facilities

Rio Tinto, “Rio Tinto and Water,” available at: www.riotinto.com/documents/reportspublications/rtandwater.pdf.
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Innovative water treatment solutions that can be carried out in a stand-alone and
sustainable manner are also being developed that can be implemented in collaboration
with local government or private sector partners or NGOs. For example, the NGO
Waterhealth International90 has developed the technology to provide water treatment
systems that, once the initial capital cost of the infrastructure has been made, can be
run sustainably for around 25 years on the basis of a water tariff that comprises the
operating and maintenance costs of treating the water.
Any CSR program for the supply of water points or treatment facilities should be done in
collaboration with communities and local partnerships with NGOs, donors, and local
authorities to ensure that such schemes have community buy-in, are sustainable without
continued involvement of the mining company beyond the initial capital investment, and fit
into local and national development goals for the provision of safe drinking water.
Such a strategy would increase the company’s social license to operate in these areas, and
assist the government in meeting their goals of drinking water supply in rural areas.

STEP 3: Verifying the necessary preconditions
The following pre-conditions need to be addressed or progressed to facilitate synergies
between mining companies’ water – and water infrastructure - needs and national water
development goals.
a. Legal and regulatory framework
Environmental and water regulations should enforce a zero tolerance policy on
environmental waste and discharge of mine effluents, and limit the quantities and
sources of fresh water that mining companies can extract, in order to prevent a strain
on available fresh water sources or contamination and alteration of the course or flow
rate of existing water sources.
i.

Strict environmental regulations – international standards, strict
penalties
Strict environmental regulations are required that hold mines to best
environmental practices in relation to effluent discharge, tailings storage,
ingress water, the use of chemicals in mining processing, and mine closure.
There should also be strict penalties for environmental degradation and
contamination of water sources, both during the mining operations and for a
period of time after mine closure.

ii.

90

Water licensing regime

See Waterhealth International website: http://www.waterhealth.com/.

65

Draft for public consultation: January 2014
A Framework to Approach Shared Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure –Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment

There needs to be a clear legal and regulatory framework for the allocation of
water rights among competing users. Mining companies should be required
to apply for a water license that is separate from the land that forms part of a
mining concession. The allocation of water should be made on the basis of
clear and transparent criteria, with the overriding objective of minimizing a
mining company’s fresh water usage and incentivizing the mining company to
maximize water recycling and re-use.
At a minimum a water rights regime should:
I.
clarify how water will be allocated among competing users;
II.
ensure that water allocations to mines take into account (1) the
availability of water resources, (2) the cumulative effect of water use
in space and time, and (3) the mining operations’ ability to minimize
its water use by implementing more efficient water management
systems and recycling water;
III.
provide for a transparent system of granting and evaluating water
licenses, including how the water tariff is calculated; and
IV.
provide for a mechanism to adjust the allocation of water rights over
the life of the mining concession with a built in review mechanism.
b. Ensure institutional setting that enforces and monitors water rights is in place
It is fundamental to ensure that an institutional setting that enforces and monitors
water rights is in place.
i.

Clear information
To make informed decisions, the following types of information are required:






Hydrological data on the location, variability, and renewability of existing
water resources to properly understand the existing water sources, any
seasonal fluctuations in water availability, and anticipated climatic changes
during the life span of the mine
User demands in relation to existing water resources
Analysis of cumulative effects of water users on water source during the life
of a mine
Baseline study of water quality from which to monitor changes in water

In some cases, the mining company may take the initiative to increase
investments in technology to improve monitoring and transparency. Investment in
infrastructure to monitor water quality may avoid contamination and future
liabilities and can improve the relations of the company with local communities.
ii.

Coordination among government ministries and agencies

In order to build the institutional setting, one of the most important requirements,
but also one of the biggest challenges faced by governments, is the coordination
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of different specialized agencies, authorities and ministries. Mining companies
negotiating large-scale mining projects involving the building of water
infrastructure must coordinate with the ministries/authorities responsible for the
following:





allocating water among competing users;
financing the construction of, owning and operating & maintaining water
infrastructure;
providing drinking water & sanitation; and
the environment,

to ensure that mining-related investments in infrastructure are aligned with, and
leverage, national and local development goals in relation to ensuring a reliable
and potable source of drinking water to communities.
iii.

Institutional capacity to monitor water usage and compliance with
environmental best practices

The relevant ministries/agencies need to have a workable level of human and
financial capacity to monitor a mining company’s water and environmental
footprint.
iv.

Institutional presence and capacity to supply water
A credible local government authority is required for any sustainable public
private partnership to occur in relation to shared use water infrastructure. In the
absence of a local water authority, a mining company may be able to partner with
an NGO or private sector water supplier to provide low cost water supply
solutions that are community-led. However, it will be difficult to scale up such
initiatives, or to leverage mining-related water investments in piped water
infrastructure in such a scenario.

Example: The Sierra Leone Water Company (SALWACO)
SALWACO is responsible for the provision of water supply and water infrastructure
outside of Freetown. However, its operation is currently limited to certain provincial
capitals and secondary towns and is largely unreliable. A mining company is unlikely to
consider relying on SALWACO, or a local authority where SALWACO is absent, to
obtain or treat its water. Mines require certainty of water supply and cost, neither of
which can be guaranteed under the current set up.
c. Full cost recovery reflected in water tariff
For any mining company initiative to be viable and sustainable a water tariff must be
payable. While full cost recovery may not always be feasible, given that certain
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segments of the population are unable to pay, at a minimum, the water tariff should
include the cost of operating and maintaining a water system.
d. Sustainability of water infrastructure
A mining company is unlikely to consider sharing any water infrastructure if it must
carry out the operation and maintenance of a water system outside of the mining site
once it has financed and/or procured the construction of water supply or water
treatment facilities. In such a scenario, the only scope for the provision of water
supply services by a mining company would be as part of its CSR policy, i.e. by
financing low cost water supply and treatment technologies.
Example: In Liberia, with the exception of the former mining towns such as the LAMCO
town in Yekepa which has an old water piping system, no area outside of Monrovia has a
water treatment and distribution network, let alone a functional one. In the absence of a
credible water authority or local partner able to operate and maintain water infrastructure,
it is unlikely that a mining company would invest in a piped water supply system or an
off-site water treatment facility.
The sustainability of any mining-related water investment needs to be considered and
addressed, particularly where the infrastructure needs to be operated and maintained.
Three ways to promote stability are:
I.

Ensuring community buy-in – Any water infrastructure investment made for
the benefit of a community must be carried out in continued consultation with
representatives of the target community and other local stakeholders that have
an interest in the provision and treatment of potable water in that community.

II.

Partnership with representatives from local government, or the water
authority legally responsible for provision of water in that area to help
build the institutional capacity to operate and maintain the water facility after
mine closure.

III.

Community-led initiative to maintain and operate the facility – In the
absence of a credible water authority, a local community could appoint a
committee or local representatives to oversee the operation and maintenance
of the water supply/ treatment system and collect a water tariff for water
delivered that at a minimum covers the cost of operating and maintaining the
system, or is otherwise subsidized by donor funding.
Some NGOs and donor-led water and sanitation programs operating in rural
areas build capacity in local communities to manage water supply and
treatment systems.
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STEP 4: Negotiating points
This section considers points that may be raised during the negotiation of collaborative water arrangements between mining
companies, the government, and/ or an NGO or private sector water utility. The list is not exhaustive, but sets out some initial
questions to consider.

Step
4: Pre-conditions
Negotiating
Points
Mines
+  Excess capacity built in at design phase of desalination
Excess
plant/ distribution network/ waste water treatment plant
Supply
 Commercially viable off-take agreement between
company and water authority.
 Clear regulatory framework for agreement between
mine and water utility
 Water utility/ local authority as a credible off-taker
 Adequate distribution infrastructure to supply water

Negotiating Points
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How should minimum deliverable quantity of excess
water be determined?
How will reliable supply of guaranteed amount of
water be secured?
What will be the water charge that the public authority
pays to the mining company for the water?
Who will own the infrastructure?
Who will operate and maintain the infrastructure?
Is the local/ water authority a viable partner? The
mining company may require step in rights to seek
comfort regarding reliability of service, or a guarantee
that the local authority will pay for the provision for
water services.
Who is responsible for the financing, construction, and
maintenance of distribution network?
When the mine ceases operations what becomes of the
infrastructure?
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Mines
as 
anchor for 
water
demand to

encourage
investment





Mining company as a creditworthy offtaker
Water demand and consumption data for geographical
area
Sufficient water supply to meet mining demand and
domestic demand of surrounding communities.
Certainty of pass through costs (variable components)
in the water tariff
Feasible investment for mining company to extend
distribution infrastructure both to mine site and to
surrounding communities previously not connected to
water distribution system within a defined radius.
Legislation for public-private investment











Mines
CSR

+ 



Partnership between mining companies and 
government/donor/NGOs
Motivation for mines to take part - contractual 
requirement or part of CSR initiative
Clear framework articulating responsibilities of each 
party

70

Is the local/ public authority a creditworthy partner? If
not, what kind of credit support will be required? Step
in rights?
Is the timeframe for commissioning the water supply
and distribution system in line with the mining
operations?
What provisions will be made for delays/stoppages in
water availability?
Who will construct distribution lines to the mine site?
If distribution, storage, and/ or water treatment
infrastructure is privately financed, will ownership be
transferred to the public authority?
Water tariff: What is the water tariff charged to the
mining company? What are the pass through elements
of the tariff? Mining companies will want certainty as
to water costs. Will the full financing costs be reflected
in the water tariff to the mining company? Financiers
may also require debt service and financing costs to be
treated as a pass through in the water tariff
Is this part of a mining company’s CSR initiatives or is
it to be a contractual obligation?92
Do CSR proposals align with national development
goals in relation to water and sanitation?
Which parties will be involved: Government (national/
local authorities, or water agency), donors, NGOs,
private sector water provider?
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Capacity of each party to carry out its role

91
[Presence of local government/utility in rural areas]

Effective demand/willingness to pay at least the
operational and maintenance costs for water in
communities

92

What are the responsibilities of each party?
What is the geographical area for which the CSR
program will be provided?

Developing model concession agreements mandating the provision of potable water within a certain radius would increase certainty for investors, put all
mining companies on an equal footing in their corporate social responsibility programs, and increase the accountability of government as the contract
enforcement authority.
91
Where a mining company is providing small scale water supply or treatment technology, a local government partner or water authority may not be required.
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Framework 4
Shared Use in the context of Information and Communication
Technologies
Introduction
The contribution of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) to national
development is widely recognized. While ICT products directly contribute to wealth creation,
their use also contributes indirectly to economic development by empowering individuals to
take advantage of new opportunities in sectors such as agriculture, health and education.93
For instance, farmers use ICT to obtain information on prices for their produce and
purchases. Yet, despite a positive general trend, estimates suggest that 1.1 billion households
around the world are still unconnected, primarily in developing countries.94 As many as 16
of the 24 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (accounting for 86% of the continent’s population)
95
lack access to a submarine cable.96
ICT infrastructure is employed in all phases of a mine life because it increases efficiency and
improves cost savings for the mining company. This can be through better logistics, allowing
virtual operations, ore grade optimization and better exploration analyses. Instantaneous
access to video, voice and data communications also provides the mining company with the
ability to use materials and human resources more effectively, minimizing waste and time
delays and strengthening logistical coordination. Finally, ICT can also help mitigate security
risks and improve the safety of a mining company’s employees.97 In the absence of ICT
infrastructure, mining companies would be subject to communication delays and reliant on
costly satellite phones.
However, as this framework explains, by capitalizing on the mining industry’s demand for
ICT services, it is possible to both develop the national ICT infrastructure and increase
coverage in remote areas where mining companies tend to operate. Effective coordination
could even result in mining operations benefiting from considerable cost-savings.

93

Panos London Policy Briefing: “ICTs and development in Zambia: challenges and opportunities,” October
2010.
94
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Press Release, “ITU releases latest global technology
development figures,” February 2013.
95
Vivien Foster “Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic - Overhauling the Engine of Growth: Infrastructure in
Africa,” (2007) available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/AICD_exec_summ_930-08a.pdf.
96
Undersea cables carry most of international ICT traffic. The reasons are that their reliability is high and their
carrying capacity is in the terabits per second, while satellites generally offer only megabits per second and
display higher latency.
97
Perrine Toledano and Clara Roorda, “Leveraging mining demand and investment in ICT for broader needs.”
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, Columbia University (June 2014) available at:
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/05/CCI-Policy-Paper-Leveraging-Mining-Related-ICT-Infrastructure-forDevelopment-June-20141.pdf
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Key Definitions
ICT infrastructure: refers to the types of network, such as telecommunications towers,
antennae and fiber optic cable networks through which telecommunication is conveyed.
ICT services: any form of signal or data transmission by means of a telecommunication
network by a telecommunication company (e.g. wireless signals, telephone services,
broadcasting).
Broadband: refers to the medium of wide bandwidth which can facilitate highspeed data transmission of multiple data signals simultaneously. Broadband technology can
be used across a large range of frequencies and data types.
Different Internet Technologies used by the Mines
Satellite: In remote areas, the cost of terrestrial solutions can be very high. Satellites provide
an attractive option as they are able to cover a large geographic area at a relatively low and
fixed cost. However, they also have less transmission capacity than terrestrial options such as
fiber optic cables. The large distance between the satellite and users on earth can result in
delays known as latency. Communications with the satellite take place via an earth station or
individual antenna, the size and strength of which depends on the frequency being used.
Large antennas are typically installed for high-bandwidth applications. Smaller antennas,
such as Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) are more commonly used to satisfy lowerbandwidth requirements.
Microwave: Microwave systems use frequencies of between 6GHz and 38GHz), and involve
point-to-point or point-to-multipoint broadband transmission. It is usually used to transport
broadband data signals over relatively short distances (40–70 km, depending on the exact
frequency used). A typical microwave system would involve the transmission of microwave
communications between antennas placed on a series of telecommunications towers, using
line of sight microwave radio technology.
Fiber optic cable: Compared with the other technologies, fiber optic cable has a much higher
capacity, providing very large bandwidth at very high transmission speeds. Fiber optic can
also be used over great distances without electromagnetic interference, meaning it can be laid
next to power-distribution cables.
Copper: Copper wire is also used for long distance transmission, particularly where it is too
expensive to replace copper cables with fiber optic. While, copper wire offers less capacity
and slower transmission speeds than fiber optic cable, it can often be sufficient for low-traffic
routes.

STEP 1: Assessing the Current Situation - What is at stake?
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An important first step is to assess the ICT arrangements which mining companies currently
have in place, and why they chose this particular arrangement. At the extremes, mining
companies are either completely self-sufficient, or their operations are fully integrated into
the national ICT infrastructure. Arrangements in between these two options would involve a
hybrid of national and self-provided infrastructure.

How do mines acquire ICT
services?

Self-Provision of ICT Infrastructure & Using National Infrastructure
Services

Why?

Lack of ICT Coverage in remote mining
areas
Unreliable Service
High Cost of national ICT Services

Existing Coverage/Feasibility
expansion to mining area.
Reliable Service
Low cost of services

of

coverage

An assessment of the country’s infrastructure situation and institutional gaps is important
when identifying the most realistic scenarios of ICT-mine synergies and the necessary steps
to achieve them.

STEP 2: Identifying operational synergies
ICT service provision in remote areas where mines are often located is a challenge for
telecommunications companies as the cost of building infrastructure and providing services
to a small number of customers can be very high. As a result, in these areas of relatively low
demand, infrastructure investment and service provision does not make economic sense for a
private company. It is in this backdrop that creating ICT -mine- synergies through the mines’
demand for ICT services becomes critical. These synergies can be realized whether the mines
build their own infrastructure or not.
Potential ICT-Mine Synergies
Situations
Categories
a) Telecommunications company adds capacity to mine
1 - Mines build their own infrastructure to serve the communities.
infrastructure
b) Mines build/facilitate additional telecommunications
74

A Framework to Approach Shared Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure –Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment

capacity.
a) Mines as an anchor demand for telecommunications
companies.
2 - Mines do not build b) Construction/utility companies build required infrastructure
infrastructure
to serve mines (e.g.: power, pipeline and railways) and add
telecommunication capacity at a lower cost.
c) Government, telecommunications and mining companies
coordinate efforts and investments.

Category 1: Mining companies build their own ICT infrastructure
It is important to note that in the context of ICT, due to the complexities of service provision,
it is unrealistic to expect mines to provide both the infrastructure and services as part of a
voluntary CSR initiative. While a mine could fund the capital cost of a satellite antenna for
nearby communities, for example, it would remain necessary for telecom providers to then
provide telecommunication services to the communities. Thus, the options below either
present a commercial opportunity for the mines to benefit from the arrangements, or a need
for regulations to mandate that the mines engage in shared access (to its ICT infrastructure)
arrangements.
a. Telecommunications company adds capacity to mine infrastructure
In the situation where there is no reliable ICT infrastructure in the area in which a mining
operation is located, mining companies may choose to provide their own infrastructure. In
this case, opportunities may exist for expanding access to this infrastructure to enable
telecommunications companies to provide ICT services to nearby communities at a lower
cost.
In remote and sparsely populated areas, it may not be economically viable for
telecommunications companies to construct towers themselves, due to insufficient demand
and high operational costs. For example, with regard to fiber optic networks, a study by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) indicates that around
68% of the costs in the first year of extending the fiber optic network to the premises are
related to civil works.98
In these contexts, mining companies often install radio signaling systems or fiber optic
networks along their grids, railroad tracks, or pipelines to improve the monitoring, efficiency
and safety of their ICT infrastructure. This requires the mine to fund all, or a significant part
of the installation costs of telecommunications towers or fiber networks. It then becomes
economical for telecommunications companies to add telecommunication capacity to this
infrastructure. While such a scenario has not been found in Africa to date, it is becoming
more common on other continents. For instance, in Peru, Compania Minera Antamina
(Antamina) built a US$2 million fiber optic network to carry information along its 304km
copper and zinc concentrate slurry pipeline system to provide information and detect
disturbances on the pipeline at every point along its length. Realizing that the optical fiber
would make it easier to service the Huaylas and Conchucos areas with telecommunication
98

OECD, “Public Rights of Way for Fibre Deployment to the Home,” April 2008.
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services, Antamina partnered with Telefonica del Peru to provide ICT services to nearby
communities at a reduced cost.99
In the example above, the mining company was willing to allow access to its infrastructure by
a telecommunications company, perhaps driven by a motivation to maintain its social license
to operate. Government policies of co-location, which prohibit the duplication of
telecommunications infrastructure where existing infrastructure can co-host other operators,
can mandate such infrastructure sharing arrangements, recognizing that mining companies
may not always be willing to allow access to their infrastructure (see Section 3 and regulation
on co-location from Liberia below).
b. Mines Build Additional Telecommunications Capacity and Lease to
Telecommunications
Another possible situation is one where mining companies not only allow access to their
infrastructure, but add extra telecommunication capacity to the infrastructure and lease it to a
telecom company.
There may be commercial motivations for the mine to do this, as leasing additional
telecommunication capacity would create another source of revenue for its operations, at
limited additional cost. In some cases, the prospect of high revenue has led mining companies
to also enter the telecommunications market. Once again, examples have not been found in
Africa but on other continents. For instance, in 2001, Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, a
Brazilian mining company had a plan to create a new company, RailCom, that would offer
telecommunications infrastructure through dark fiber optic cables along 10,000 km of rail
lines in the Southeast and Northeast of the country at an investment of US$100 million, and
lease it to telecommunications companies. Although this involved a large capital outlay, Vale
expected a financial return of US$300 million in five years.100
In most cases mining (and oil) companies have opted to partner with telecommunications
companies, instead of building a new venture, to share costs and synergies. An illustration
from the oil sector in Malaysia shows that the national oil company Petronas and the main
telecommunications company of the country, Celcom have together built Celcom Petro
Network to install a ﬁber optic network along the national gas pipeline to address the
telecommunication needs of Petronas and lease the spare capacity to other mobile operators
and corporate customers.101 Similar schemes are expected for the cable that will be installed
along the planned Nigeria-Algeria pipeline.102
While in many cases mining companies are driven by commercial motivations to lease
telecommunications capacity, or enter the telecommunications market themselves, one should
recognize that this may not always be the case. In many cases, a mining company may not be
inclined to provide a service that falls far outside of the scope of its core activities. In this
case, governments may opt to mandate an obligation for the provision of excess ICT capacity
in the terms of the mining company’s concession agreement.
Category 2: Mines do not build infrastructure
99

Toledano, Roorda, “Leveraging mining demand and investment in ICT for broader needs,” op.cit.
Ibid.
101
Ibid.
102
“Fibre Optic Infrastructure: Using the Valuable Resource for Multiple Tasks,” ICT Africa,
Jun 2013, available at: http://www.ictafrica.info/FullNews.php?id=9592.
100
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a. Mines as an anchor demand for telecommunications companies
When there is a mining operation in remote, sparsely populated and unconnected areas, the
mine could provide a sufficient level of guaranteed demand for ICT services to justify
investment by telecommunications companies.
Example: Mozambique – when mines serve as anchor demand
In Mozambique, Ncondezi Coal entered into an agreement with Vodacom whom it
considered to be the most reliable provider, for the provision of mobile phone service around
its site. Vodacom constructed a telecom tower and installed a satellite, based on a minimum
guaranteed demand from Ncondezi. This allowed Vodacom to expand its footprint in the
area, enabling access by users in a 10km radius around the tower, and has generated 3000
additional contracts with users who otherwise had extremely limited or no mobile phone
coverage.103
Under this arrangement, companies will sign a contract that will cover the telecommunication
company’s costs of building and/ or extending the requisite ICT infrastructure. The cost may
be split among the companies with the percentage depending on the amount of services being
provided to the mining company and the potential additional market for the
telecommunication company in the area.104 This arrangement would enable the mining
company to receive essential ICT services and the telecommunication company to expand its
subscriber base, all at a lower cost to both parties than if they had decided to do so on their
own.
In the event that the mine’s demand is not sufficient to generate a commercially viable deal,
the government could take measures to strengthen the anchor demand. This might involve
adding its own demand, or providing subsidies to subscribers in a remote, low-income area.
Local governments could also coordinate demand from public administration institutions,
local schools and health care facilities in order to create sufficient anchor demand.
b. Utility/Construction companies building required infrastructure to mines (e.g.
power, pipeline and railways) add telecommunication capacity at a lower cost
Economies of scope exist when a range of products can be produced or services provided
together at a cheaper price than each product is produced or service is provided on its own. In
the context of a mining operation, such economies of scope will arise when the outputs of one
type of infrastructure can be used as the inputs of another type of infrastructure. Therefore, it
is important to recognize that sharing should be encouraged not only within the ICT sector,
but also together with other infrastructure industries (such as power utilities, water and
sewage pipelines, and railways). For example, as mentioned above, since a large part of the
costs of building a fiber optic network are related to civil works, joint infrastructure
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Nicolas Maennling, Alpa Shah and Sophie Thomashausen, “A Framework to Approach the Issue of Shared
Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure: Case Study: Mozambique,” Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment,
Columbia University, (2014).
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Toledano, Roorda, “Leveraging mining demand and investment in ICT for broader needs,” op.cit.
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construction – such as laying ICT networks along railway tracks or water pipeline -- can
result in important savings for the telecommunications companies.
In remote mining areas, the cost savings of such infrastructure sharing may be significant
enough to make telecommunication services economically viable. For example, in Canada
the power utility FNEI was only able to provide telecommunication services to nearby
communities at an affordable cost after a De Beers mine agreed to let the company use its
electricity grid infrastructure to build a fiber optic cable.105
Example: Zambia – Capitalizing on power lines for ICT services
In Zambia, power utility company Copperbelt Energy Corporation (CEC) has installed fiber
optic cables on its power lines to increase the quality of its ICT infrastructure. The company
has approximately 500km of optical fiber network connecting Zambia’s mines in the
Copperbelt region. Significant spare capacity existed on this network, and as a result CEC
asked for a license which allowed it to lease excess capacity to other entities. As a result, in
2005 CEC became the first company in Zambia to offer broadband optical fiber services.106
In order to ensure that such economies of scope are realized, the government will play a key
role in identifying opportunities, as well as facilitating negotiations between
telecommunications companies and mining companies/ mining infrastructure providers to
allow access to the relevant infrastructure. For instance, as seen in Step 3, the government
could pass regulations on mandatory access to “passive infrastructure” or could set up online
information sharing platforms to inform stakeholders about opportunities for shared access.
c. Government, telecommunications and mining companies coordinate efforts and
investments
Another possibility for an ICT-mine synergy is a situation where the mine demand in a
remote region is sufficient to attract a government program to finance and facilitate ICT
infrastructure provision. In Australia, the government is building ICT infrastructure across
the country and selling wholesale services to internet and telephone providers. In particular, it
is prioritizing the connection of remote areas where significant demand of mining operations
may attract service providers.107
However, the government may not always have the budget to provide ICT infrastructure,
especially in developing countries. In addition, the timeframe of government investments in
this sector might not be in line with that of the mining companies, who may want to expedite
the construction of the infrastructure necessary for the commencement of their operations. In
this context, there is scope for the government, the telecommunications company and the
mining company to coordinate efforts to build the infrastructure together. It would enable the
government to connect remote communities, a mining company to connect its mine and a
telecommunications company to expand its subscriber base. This would be at a lower cost to
all parties than if they decided to do on their own.

105

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Ibid.
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STEP 3: Verifying the necessary preconditions
3A: What are the necessary preconditions for each potential ICT-mine synergy?
Depending on the situation, the type of policy needed to incentivize the buildup of ICT
infrastructure will vary. This section sets out the necessary legal, institutional and regulatory
conditions, and then goes on to suggest a number of policy considerations which might
facilitate the sharing of mines’ ICT infrastructure, and the use of mines as an anchor demand
for investments by telecommunications companies.
Necessary Regulatory Framework for ICT- Mining Synergies
Situations
Categories
Necessary
Pre-conditions
framework

a) Telecommunications
company adds capacity
1. Mines build to mine infrastructure to
serve the communities.
their own
infrastructure

Open Access (possibility
for third parties to use an
existing network
infrastructure)
- Co-location

b) Mines build/facilitate
additional
telecommunications
capacity.

a) Mines as an anchor
demand for
telecommunications
companies.
2. Mines do
not build
infrastructure

b) Construction/utility
companies build
required infrastructure
to serve mines (e.g.:
power, pipeline and
railways) and add
telecommunication
capacity at a lower cost

regulatory

Licensing facilitation and
infrastructure sharing
Comprehensive and
independent
regulatory system.
Long term agreement and
guarantee mechanisms.
Government financial
support if needed.
Collaborative
environment
between private and
public stakeholders Open access and
(mining company, Infrastructure Sharing
telecommunications Framework.
companies,
government
agencies).

c) Government,
telecommunications and
mining companies
coordinate efforts and
investments.

PPP enabling environment.
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3B: Are these preconditions in place?
a. Legal, Institutional & Regulatory Framework: Setting the Basis for ICT-Mine
Synergies
i.

Liberalized Market and Open Access Policy

A prerequisite to effectively leverage the ICT demand of mining companies is a competitive
telecommunications sector. Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa still have a monopoly over
certain segments of their telecommunications sector (e.g. the mobile phone market in
Ethiopia, or the international gateway in Sierra Leone).
The trend in recent years has been the unbundling of the ICT services and liberalization of the
market to encourage competition from private participants. Without a competitive market, the
mines would be unable to enter to extend services to a wider coverage area and would be
forced to coordinate with potentially inefficient monopoly partners, limiting the incentives to
leverage ICT infrastructure.
In addition, a policy of open access available on transparent, non-discriminatory terms, and at
fair prices is a necessary pre-condition for sharing infrastructure.
ii.

Regulatory Framework: Encouraging Mine Participation

Regulatory Capacity: For private participants to be incentivized to participate, such a
liberalized market must also be well-regulated with respect to quality of service, as well as
the tariffs in the market, to ensure that company price-setting is competitive. Mining
companies will only be incentivized to demand services from national telecommunications
companies (under the Category 2 options) if they can ensure a lower cost and more reliable
service than self-provision.
In addition, in the context of open access, an important challenge faced by regulators is
maintaining sufficient competition in the market as well as incentives for investment in new
infrastructure. Mining companies that build the infrastructure may reduce future investment
in additional capacity if their facilities are open to telecommunication service providers at
low rates, particularly in remote areas where the economic rationale for building additional
infrastructure is weak. However, if access prices are too high, telecommunications service
providers either will not enter the market or will choose to install their own networks,
resulting in inefficient duplication of infrastructure. In this case, the government should
implement a regime where other companies seeking to access the infrastructure have access
on reasonable terms. A solution is often a light-touch regulatory solution letting the parties
negotiate first, with the regulator stepping in only in case of disagreement.
The regulator must also manage risks, monitor contractual obligations with
telecommunications companies and effectively regulate access. It should be noted that the
most appropriate regulatory system depends on the institutional context and the reforms being
undertaken. It may be that an independent regulator is not essential to the reform process. If
the institutional capacity of a country is limited, it could instead outsource regulatory
functions to a third party or expert panel.108

108

World Bank – Africa Infrastructure 2011.
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Licensing and Spectrum Management: Efficient, clear, affordable and flexible licensing
processes are important to allow, and to incentivize, mining companies to expand their ICT
services, which are already outside of the scope of their main activities. The categorization of
licenses can impact incentives significantly. Traditional licensing has typically required
different and separate licenses for different technologies as well as for different types of
services. To increase efficiency and incentives for companies, governments are increasingly
allowing flexible use, particularly through technical and service rules by adopting technology
and service neutrality. 109 In order to increase flexibility in the licensing process, regulators
have also begun to adopt even more unified frameworks to reduce the number of
authorizations needed to carry out a number of activities (mobile phones, internet,
broadcasting, etc.). Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda, are some
of the countries that have already implemented technology- and service-neutral licensing
frameworks.110 If it becomes clear that licensing is a barrier that reduces the potential to
leverage the use of mining operations’ ICT infrastructure, regulatory agencies may consider a
license exemption in certain cases.
In addition to adopting licenses that increase flexibility of the technology and service use, it is
also important to adopt licensing processes that maximize the use of spectrum. The spectrum
extends from low frequencies used for radio communication, to high-frequency, short
wavelength gamma radiation used for very high technology science.
New technologies enable multiple services to be provided using the same spectrum, which
increases the need of regulators allocating spectrum rights more efficiently. To facilitate
involvement of mining companies in the ICT sector, there must be a system of equitable
access to spectrum for telecommunication carriers and industry.
An illustration of the problem comes from Australia, in the Pilbara region, where the
emergence of 4G technologies has led to a growth in demand for access to the 1800MHz
spectrum band in remote areas. For mining operations, 1800MHz spectrum band is
increasingly being used to support safety and operational systems on mine sites and is
expected to increase to support communications systems and automated equipment
technologies. So far, however, access to this appropriate spectrum has not been readily
available to non-telecommunication carrier entities in the Pilbara region.111
b. Encouraging and Regulating Shared Access to Mine Infrastructure
Shared access to mine - related infrastructure underpins the Category 1b and Category 2b
options set out under Step 2. This sub-section explores conditions that would be conducive to
shared infrastructure access in the ICT context.
Infrastructure sharing aims to extend networks to areas where service provision is
commercially viable if several operators share the costs of infrastructure. As mentioned under
Step 2, there is scope for sharing ICT infrastructure within the sector (between mines’ own
infrastructure and telecommunications companies), as well as across sectors, particularly
109

Under technology neutrality, operators should be allowed to use whatever technology or equipment standard
they wish in order to meet market demands, subject to technical limitations. Under service neutrality, operators
should be allowed to provide whatever services their technology and infrastructure can deliver (Toledano,
Roorda, “Leveraging mining demand and investment in ICT for broader needs”, op.cit.)
110
Article 3 of the Electronic and Postal Communications Act, 2010, available at:
http://www.tcra.go.tz/policy/epoca.
111
CCSI, “Leveraging mining demand and investment in ICT for broader needs,” op.cit
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those infrastructure sectors which are serving the mines (e.g. power utilities, railways,
pipelines). However, in order to facilitate synergies across these sectors, a clear model for
infrastructure sharing is necessary. This will enable services to be made available in a
timelier and more cost effective way, and to manage and reduce the risk undertaken by
investors. In addition, while mining companies could be contractually obliged under their
concession agreements to enter into ICT infrastructure sharing arrangements, there are a
number of ways in which government could otherwise incentivize them do so.
The following principles might apply when thinking about facilitating shared access to
infrastructure in the ICT context112
i.

Efficient use of resources

Towers, ducts and rights of way can be shared for installations that serve a similar purpose,
allowing for optimal use. Regulators could increase incentives for additional investment in
infrastructure by making such resources and rights of way readily available, especially in
public property. They might take measures such as limiting the fees charged and simplifying
the legal process involved.
The coordination of resources in this way can avoid duplication and wastage of capital
expenditure. For example, several uncoordinated national broadband fiber optic networks are
under construction in Zambia: one is being developed by the fixed telecommunications
operator ZAMTEL, while separate networks are being built by the country’s power utility
ZESCO and the Copperbelt Energy Company. Neither the government nor the
telecommunications regulator has required coordination between them.113 Similarly in
Zimbabwe, the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (Potraz), has been
criticized for not enforcing infrastructure sharing regulations114 which resulted in duplicated
work and high prices. On the contrary, Liberia is requiring co-location in its
telecommunications law.
Example from Liberia
41. Co-location115
“(1) If not otherwise addressed in interconnection or access terms determined pursuant to
Sections 34 to 38, and subject to any regulation, rule or order issued by the LTA, service
providers with existing telecommunications network facilities shall allow other service
providers to co-locate their telecommunications network facilities on those existing facilities,
including central office premises and other equipment locations, land and roof tops, mast
sites, towers, conduits, poles and underground facilities, where such co-location is technically
and economically feasible and where no significant additional construction work is required.
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Adapted from Global Symposium for Regulators GSR 2008: “Best Practice Guideline on Infrastructure
Sharing,” International Telecommunication Union, (2008), available at
http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/toolkit/docs/Document/3463.
113
Panos London Policy Briefing: “ICTs and development in Zambia: challenges and opportunities,” October
2010.
114
“ICT sector chaos: Lack of co-operation blamed.” The Standard, June 2012.
115
Section 41 of the Telecommunications Act of 2007, available
at http://www.mopt.gov.lr/doc/telecom_act_2007.pdf.

82

A Framework to Approach Shared Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure –Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment

(2) The party requesting co-location shall compensate the party required to provide colocation for such an amount as the parties may agree or, where the parties are unable to agree,
as may be determined by the LTA.
(3) Where the parties are unable to agree on the terms and conditions of co-location, either or
both of the parties may submit the matter for dispute resolution pursuant to Section 73. "
ii.

Access to Passive Infrastructure

It is possible for regulators to instate formal rights which allow carriers the right to access to
passive infrastructure that are owned by a non-carrier, i.e. players such as public utilities
companies, that provide passive network elements but which do not compete for end users.116
In this sense, if a mining company, or the owner of the mining railroad is not a licensed
carrier, then a carrier may use their infrastructure to add optical fiber at a lower cost. This
might make the realization of synergies between the mining companies and service providers
more straightforward.
Example from Australia: In Australia, the government enacted legislation (Part 20A of the
Telecommunication Act) enabling carriers looking to install optical fiber to seek access to
passive infrastructure which is owned by a non-carrier. Where non-carrier companies are
developing fiber optic networks as part of their development, they must now give the carrier
access to the facility if this is requested. As a result, if a mining company is not a licensed
carrier, then a carrier may use its infrastructure to add optical fibers at a lower cost. Access to
the infrastructure is negotiated between parties involved, but if they cannot agree then an
arbitrator, such as the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, is appointed to
determine the conditions.117
Many developing countries have enacted laws that address infrastructure sharing, but they
often fail to yield the expected results as neither the telecom operator nor the regulator has
legal authority to enforce these shared use laws. Similar to the obligation for co-location in
Liberia, the obligation for infrastructure sharing will often only be enforced if it is technically
and economically feasible without significant additional construction work.
In Mozambique, however, the National Regulator, INCM has recently issued a proposal for
“Regulations on the Installation of Telecommunications Infrastructure in Building and Public
Works,” that sets out detailed provisions for the rights of way on other infrastructure,
including railroads. The level of clarity of the obligations of the parties and of the regulator,
as well as of the conditions for access and denial access should enhance the enforceability of
such regulations (see box below).
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Adapted from “Global Symposium for Regulators GSR 2008: Best Practice Guideline on Infrastructure
Sharing,” International Telecommunication Union, op cit.
117
Toledano, Roorda, “Leveraging mining demand and investment in for broader needs,” op.cit.
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Example - Mozambique: Chapter 3 - Art. 10 of proposed regulation on right of
access to public infrastructure118
1. Operators and providers of telecommunications services have the right of access
to infrastructures suitable for the accommodation of telecommunications
networks owned or operated by the state, municipalities, the entities related to the
areas of roads, bridges, railways, electricity, gas and petroleum products.
2. The access referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be provided on terms of
equality, transparency and non-discrimination through tariffs that reflect costs.
3. The procedures for obtaining the right of access should be timely, transparent and
advertised, and cannot exceed the maximum period of 30 days after receipt of the
demand for access.
The following nine Articles under this Chapter stipulate the prohibition of exclusive use
of public infrastructure, the conditions for the denial of access to public infrastructure,
the procedures in the event of denied access, the obligations of the entities owning or
managing public infrastructure, the fees for access to and use of public infrastructure, the
procedures and conditions for access and use of public infrastructure, the details of the
request for access to public infrastructure, the conditions of use of public infrastructure
and co-location.
In addition to a regulatory framework mandating shared access, governments could also offer
financial incentives. Many countries have a Universal Access and Service Fund (UASF) to
provide financial incentives to operators to close the access gap. Infrastructure sharing could
be made a pre-requisite for receiving UASF for mining companies building infrastructure in
new areas.
iii.

Price setting mechanism and dispute resolution mechanisms

It is important that implementation of shared ICT infrastructure takes into account the
necessity of protecting the value of existing investment in infrastructure and services.
However, it is important that price, terms and conditions of access do not prevent the
implementation of sharing.119 In that context, regulators should also have in place the
necessary enforcement tools and their associated dispute resolution mechanisms to ensure
compliance with infrastructure sharing regulations.
iv.

Transparency and establishing an infrastructure sharing one-stop-shop

Transparent processes will be a key element in facilitating infrastructure sharing; market
players need to know what is available for sharing under clearly established terms and
conditions to be able work on synergies and mutually beneficial arrangements. Regulators
could require publication on websites of the details of existing as well as future infrastructure
118

Source: Article 10 of the “Proposta de Regulamento sobre Instalação de Infra-Estruturas de
Telecomunicações em Edificios e Projectos de Obras Publicas,” Ministério dos Transportes e Comunicações
(May2013), available at http://www.incm.gov.mz/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=88429f5e-129e-4ee0-a52ae52b0addabb9&groupId=10157. Translation is authors’ own.
119
Adapted from “Global Symposium for Regulators GSR 2008: Best Practice Guideline on Infrastructure
Sharing,” International Telecommunication Union, op cit.
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installations available for sharing by mining companies and other service providers, such as
“the availability of space in existing ducts, planned deployment or upgrading works and
interconnection.”120
For instance, in the proposed regulation on the installation of ICT infrastructure on buildings
and public works in Mozambique, the infrastructure owner is required to inform the
Regulatory Authority on infrastructure suitable for shared use, to prepare the registration with
geo-referenced information infrastructure suitable for shared use, develop and publish
procedures and conditions for access and use of such infrastructure, and respond to requests
for information on - access to these infrastructures.121
Transparency could be facilitated by the creation of a one-stop-shop institution for
infrastructure sharing to promote the coordination of civil works between
telecommunications companies, as well as between telecommunications companies and
utilities/mining-related construction companies.122 For example, Sierra Leone and Liberia are
currently seeing the development of their mining railroads as well as planning the laying of
their fiber optic cable around the country, suggesting that the government could play a
valuable role in coordinating possible sharing of civil works necessary to build both types of
infrastructure. Brazil is currently discussing a new telecommunication sector policy that will
require from railway concessionaires to construct fiber optic cables along their rail
network.123 In countries with strong local governance systems, local authorities could play a
role in coordinating infrastructure sharing in their regions.
v.

Setting the basis for cross border infrastructure sharing

With the possibilities for cross-border mining transport routes and regional power lines,
cross-border infrastructure sharing in the ICT context could also be an imminent reality. In
order to prepare for this, regulators might look to ensure an appropriate level of regional
harmonization. Regional organizations have an important role in ensuring that best practice
regulatory policies on sharing are widely spread, since a national regulator alone would not
be able to resolve significant cross-border issues. The Southern African Power Pool, for
example, is now requiring that new power lines include optical ground wire that has the
additional use of providing telecommunications services.124
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Ibid
Article 14 of the “Proposta de Regulamento sobre Instalação de Infra-Estruturas de Telecomunicações em
Edificios e Projectos de Obras Publicas,” Ministério dos Transportes e Comunicações (May2013), available at
http://www.incm.gov.mz/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=88429f5e-129e-4ee0-a52ae52b0addabb9&groupId=10157. Translation is authors’ own.
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Step 4: Negotiating points
This section considers points that may be raised during the negotiation of collaborative mine-ICT arrangements between the government, mining
companies and telecommunications companies. The list is not exhaustive, but sets out some initial questions to consider.
Situations
Categories
Negotiating Points




Telecommunications company adds capacity
to mine infrastructure to serve the
communities






Mines
build
their
own
Mines build/facilitate additional
infrastructure
telecommunications capacity and lease it to
telecommunication companies





In the absence of open-access, or a co-location framework, will the mine
give access to its infrastructure voluntarily? If not, there will be a need for
a contractual obligation.
What are the conditions of infrastructure access? These include price and
non-price factors, such as the length of the access agreement.
How will access to mine infrastructure be allocated? Competitive
bidding/auction by regulator? Negotiation with mining company?
What are the rights and responsibilities of the parties with respect to
maintenance of infrastructure?
What provisions can be made for when the mine ceases operations?
What are the dispute resolutions mechanisms that will be used in the event
of a disagreement?
Is this to be a contractual obligation of the mining company as part of its
concession agreement? In the case where the mine does not see a
commercial opportunity, there might be a need for a legal requirement.
How will additional capacity be allocated? Competitive bidding/auction by
regulator? Negotiation with mining company?
On what terms will the capacity be leased? Terms should be reasonable to
attract companies, but also not so low as to discourage mine from future
investment in additional capacity.
Are there financial incentives available to the mining company to
encourage building of additional capacity?
o E.g. UASF contributions for mining companies building additional
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capacity in new areas, tax breaks, subsidies.



What provisions can be made for when the mine ceases operations?
What are the dispute resolution mechanisms that will be used in the event
of a disagreement?



What are the responsibilities and obligations of each party under the
agreement?
What are the key terms of the offtake agreements e.g. the amount of
services being provided to the mining company, length of agreement, price
to be charged?
If the mine is sharing in the capital cost, on which basis will each party
contribute?
Is the mine offtake a sufficient anchor demand? If not, is it necessary for
measures to be taken by government to create an additional anchor
demand?
Do additional financial incentives need to be provided to the
telecommunications company e.g. UASF contributions?
In the event of service going down, does the mine get priority access?
What provisions can be made for when the mine ceases operations?


Mines as an anchor demand for
telecommunications companies








Mines do not
build
infrastructure

Construction/utility companies
build
required infrastructure to serve mines (e.g.:
power, pipeline and railways) and add
telecommunication capacity at a lower cost




Which parties will be involved? This will depend on the resources and
rights of way to be used by the telecommunications company (public vs.
private property)? In case of no access to passive infrastructure regulations
– can it be a contractual requirement?
If multiple telecommunications companies are looking for access to the
infrastructure, how will rights be allocated? Competitive bidding/auction
by regulator? Negotiation with mining company?
Under what terms will access to infrastructure be granted?
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Government, telecommunication
and
mining companies coordinate efforts and
investments









What are the rights and responsibilities of the parties with respect to
maintenance of infrastructure?
In the event that the original infrastructure is damaged or negatively
affected, how will this be compensated?
What are the dispute resolution mechanisms that will be used in the event
of a disagreement?

Which parties will be involved?
What are the responsibilities and obligations of each party under the
agreement?
What are the key terms of offtake agreements e.g. the amount of services
being provided to the mining company, length of agreement, price to be
charged?
If the mine is sharing in the capital cost, on which will each party
contribute?
Is the mine’s offtake a sufficient anchor demand? If not, is it necessary for
measures to be taken by government to create an additional anchor
demand?
In the event of restriction of services, does the mine get priority access?
What provisions can be made for when the mine ceases operations?
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ANNEX A
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The Shared Use of Mining-Related
Infrastructure
Expert workshop
November 15, 2013
Columbia University

PROGRAM
With support from:

About the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), a joint center of Columbia Law School and
the Earth Institute at Columbia University, is a leading applied research center and forum for the
study, practice and discussion of sustainable international investment. Our mission is to develop and
disseminate practical approaches and solutions to maximize the impact of international investment
for sustainable development. The CCSI’s premise is that responsible investment leads to benefits for
both investors and the residents of host countries. Through research, advisory projects, multistakeholder dialogue and educational programs, the CCSI focuses on constructing and implementing
a holistic investment framework that promotes sustainable development and the mutual trust needed
for long-term investments, that can be practically adopted by governments, companies and civil
society

About the Natural Resource Charter
The Natural Resource Charter is a manual of best practice aimed at governments and citizens of
resource rich countries. It provides practical policy advice to support decision-making that can best
harness the economic potential of resource extraction, including leveraging resource-related
infrastructure for sustainable development.
The Natural Resource Charter is delighted to support this project as it seeks to address an identified
gap in knowledge and good practice principles around shared-use infrastructure. A key pillar of the
Natural Resource Charter is helping countries leverage investments associated with resource
extraction to benefit the wider economy and raise the welfare of citizens. The development of this
framework by CCSI is an important step towards this goal. Lessons from the survey of worldwide
experience will help inform Charter recommendations on this topic as well as the design of the
Charter's country benchmarking tool, which is now being deployed in various resource rich countries.

About the Sustainable Development Solutions Network
The Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) mobilizes scientific and technical expertise
from academia, civil society, and the private sector in support of sustainable development problem
solving at local, national, and global scales. This Solutions Network accelerates joint learning and
helps to overcome the compartmentalization of technical and policy work by promoting integrated
approaches to the interconnected economic, social, and environmental challenges confronting the
world. The SDSN provides expert advice and support to the various international processes working
on the post-2015 development agenda; identifies, vets, and promotes solutions that accelerate
progress towards sustainable development; and develops and disseminates online education material
for sustainable development
The Network is structured around thematic groups of global experts that work to identify common
solutions and highlight best practices. Thematic Group 10 is on the Good Governance of Extractive
and Land Resources.
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Background
To be beneficial for a country’s development, non-renewable resource extraction should be
leveraged to build infrastructure that will support sustainable and inclusive growth. This is
especially critical for countries facing an infrastructure-funding gap (in Africa alone there is
an estimated annual infrastructure funding gap of US$31 billion according to the World
Bank’s Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic.) While this can be achieved by capitalizing
on resource taxation potential and reinvesting the tax revenues in public infrastructure, it can
also be accomplished by requiring shared use of the infrastructure built by/for the mining
sector to expand infrastructure coverage and access. However, the potential for leveraging
mining-related infrastructure for broader development is often not realized.
Mining companies have historically adopted an enclave approach to infrastructure
development, providing their own power and transportation facilities to meet their “pit-toport” infrastructure needs. Major investments in physical infrastructure are also generally
uncoordinated with national infrastructure development plans. Hence, opportunities are
missed for promoting shared use of the infrastructure and taking advantage of potential
synergies.
In 2013, CCSI was granted an project from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade to develop an economically, legally and operationally rational framework to enable
shared use of mining-related infrastructure, including rail, ports, power, water, internet and
telecommunications. The framework builds on a worldwide survey of regulatory, commercial
and operating models of shared use of rail, port and power infrastructure previously
conducted by CCSI. It has been obtained by distilling best practice principles from
infrastructure developments around the world, guided by expert opinion. It has most recently
also been refined through in-depth case studies in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mozambique,
although its principles aim to be of general relevance to all resource rich African countries.
The framework aims at providing guidance to policy makers on how to approach the question
of shared use, highlighting the operational models that are necessary for implementation, the
key-success factors, the enabling conditions and how to ultimately better coordinate major
investments in physical infrastructure by privately-owned natural resource concessionaires
with national infrastructure development plans. The framework will also equip policy makers
with a set of questions that should help conduct the negotiations on shared use with
companies. The ultimate goal of the framework is to include shared infrastructure use as part
of the planning and negotiation stages of extractive industry investments
This workshop is designed to get feedback on the framework from mining-related
infrastructure experts from academia, companies, governments, and donor and to discuss
ways on how it could be improved.
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7:45am – 8:30am: Registration and breakfast
8:30am – 8:45am: Opening remarks
The opening remarks will introduce the framework and provide answers to the following questions:
 What is the framework for and how will it be used?
 What is the timeline to deliver the final product?
 How is this going to change the way things have been done previously?
8:45am – 9:15am: Keynote speaker – Jeffrey Sachs
9:15am – 10:00am: Building power and mining synergies
 What are the different power sourcing arrangements for mining operations?
 What are the pre-conditions to enable synergies?
 What points need to be addressed at the negotiation table to enable such
synergies?
10:00am – 10:15am: Coffee Break
10:15am – 11:15pm: Round-table discussion on the findings
11:15pm – 11:45pm: Minimizing the water footprint of mining and increasing access to
[potable] water supply for communities
 What are the models for supplying excess/ treated/ potable water to
communities?
 Are there operational roadblocks?
 What type of regulations best minimize a mine’s water footprint and
maximize its engagement with communities on water supply?
 How do you ensure sustainability of water supply and treatment facilities
after mine closure?
 What should be the questions to ask at the negotiation table?
11:45pm – 12:30pm: Round-table discussion on the findings
12:30pm – 1:30pm: Lunch
1:30pm – 2:30pm: Enabling shared use in rail and ports
 What are the models best suited to promote multi-use and multi-party
access to rail and port infrastructure?
 Under which regulatory, commercial and operational conditions?
 What is the scope for brownfield renegotiations to enable shared use?
 What points need to be addressed at the negotiation table to enable shared
use?
2:30pm – 3:45pm: Round-table discussion on the findings
3:45pm – 4:15pm: Coffee break
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4:15pm – 4:45pm: What are the opportunities for increased ICT coverage in response to mining
demand and investments?
 Where should the efforts be focused?
 What regulatory structures best promote mine-related investments in expanded
ICT coverage in areas surrounding mining operations?
 What should be the questions to ask at the negotiation table?
4:45pm – 5:30pm: Round-table discussion on the findings
5:30pm – 5:45pm: Closing Remarks
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